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 A Social Norm Theory of Regulating 
Housing Speech Under the Fair Housing Act 
Stephanie M. Stern* 
ABSTRACT 
The Fair Housing Act’s prohibition of discriminatory housing statements 
presents a puzzle.  This provision regulates housing speech, such as advertise-
ments and notices, more robustly than acts of housing discrimination (e.g., dis-
criminatory refusals to rent or sell).  It extends liability regardless of intent 
and, unlike other provisions in the Fair Housing Act, does not exempt small-
scale landlords from liability.  Making discriminatory housing statements le-
gally actionable also burdens commercial speech, diverts enforcement re-
sources from discriminatory refusals to rent or sell, and gives rise to other, 
often more costly, forms of communicating preferences in residential real es-
tate transactions.  Why accord such strong protection to regulation of housing 
speech?  This Article suggests an answer.  A wealth of empirical research in 
social psychology establishes that social norms are one of the most potent 
methods of reducing prejudice.  Our beliefs about what others think, particu-
larly others who are similar to us or part of our group, shape the attitudes and 
behaviors we express toward people of different races and other protected 
classes under the Fair Housing Act.  This Article assesses the Fair Housing 
Act’s prohibition of discriminatory housing statements, as well as recent con-
flict between the Fair Housing Act and the Communications Decency Act and 
debate about roommate advertisements, in light of the power of social norms. 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”),1 which prohibits dis-
criminatory housing advertisements and statements, compels some surprising 
results.  It regulates the content of commercial speech in the absence of an 
accompanying or subsequent discriminatory act (e.g., refusal to sell or rent).2  
For example, a landlord who advertises “no Jews” or “prefer no children” in a 
newspaper advertisement has violated § 3604(c) even if he or she subsequently 
rents to a Jewish person or family with young children.3  Oral statements that 
indicate preference or discrimination, such as asking a potential buyer who 
 
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  I thank Robert Schwemm, Daphna 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Chloe Morrison, Joshua Melson, Calvin Lai, Cherie Metcalf, Jona-
than Nash, and the participants of the CLEA 2018 conference in Law & Economics for 
their helpful comments. 
 1. 42 U.S.C § 3604(c) (2018). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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phones to inquire about a property if he or she is white, similarly violate                
§ 3604(c).4 
Section 3604(c) was controversial at its inception and remains so today.  
Scholars have called the prohibition on discriminatory housing statements and 
publications the FHA’s “most intriguing provision,” while critics have alleged 
it infringes on freedom of speech, delivers minimal benefits, and entraps small-
scale landlords or roommate seekers who are unaware of its prohibitions.5  Sec-
tion 3604(c) presents puzzles that have tugged at housing policymakers and 
scholars since the FHA’s inception.  For example, the regulation of housing 
statements and advertisements is more expansive than the FHA’s treatment of 
discriminatory refusals to rent, sell, or lend.  The major exemptions to liability 
under the FHA do not apply to § 3604(c).6  In addition, unlike other anti-dis-
crimination laws, § 3604(c) does not require that the defendant have discrimi-
natory intent or, as discussed above, have committed a discriminatory act in a 
real estate transaction.7  Why does § 3604(c) impose stricter liability regardless 
of intent, with fewer exemptions, than the FHA provisions addressing actual 
acts of housing discrimination?  One wonders why the FHA, which scraped 
through the legislative process amid controversy and resistance, ultimately in-
cluded such a robust provision.8 
Psychology research on social norms suggests some answers.  Social 
norms research reveals important reasons the FHA should regulate speech de-
spite its costs – and why it should do so robustly and regardless of the speaker’s 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., Bader v. Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cty, No. G041118, 2010 WL 
740185 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2010) (discussing claims of a landlord who argued that 
receiving a violation and fines for his ambiguous housing advertisement that small 
apartment was well-suited to one or two professional adults constituted extortion and 
was devoid of public benefit); David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the 
First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV. 83, 134–38 (2001) (describing free speech concerns 
under the FHA and arguing that failures of political process impel protecting First 
Amendment rights from antidiscrimination laws); Robert G. Schwemm, Discrimina-
tory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair Housing Act’s Most 
Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 187, 187 (2001) (arguing that housing 
statement regulation was an intriguing addition to the FHA); cf. Rigel C. Oliveri, Dis-
criminatory Housing Advertisements On-Line: Lessons from Craigslist, 43 IND. L. REV. 
1125, 1152–53 (2010) (noting that most people advertising for roommates believe they 
can lawfully advertise preferences based on characteristics such as gender, race, reli-
gion, etc.). 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2018) (clarifying that § 3604(c) applies to small-
scale landlords and others otherwise exempted from the FHA); id. § 3607(a) (exemp-
tion for private clubs and religious organizations applies to discriminatory actions, not 
statements).  See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW 
AND LITIGATION ch. 15 (2018). 
 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (requiring only that the statement would “indicate” 
such a discriminatory motivation to the listener).  But see id. § 3604(a); id. §3604(b); 
id. §3604(d) (requiring that the action occur “because of” a protected status). 
 8. See infra Part I. 
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intent.  Social norms refer to expectations for individual behavior or attitudes 
derived from the norms of a group that the individual identifies with or values.9  
These expectations define and reaffirm the identity and composition of the 
group.10  Communications, both written and oral, are primary sources of infor-
mation about the prevailing norms of the group.11  Statements and other forms 
of communication affect listeners’ views of other groups and their behaviors 
toward members of “outgroups.”12  What we believe others think about groups, 
such as African-Americans, Christians, or obese individuals, is a primary de-
terminant of our own prejudices. 
A substantial body of empirical research shows that reducing the appear-
ance of prejudiced attitudes or acts of discrimination can lessen the expression 
of prejudiced attitudes and promote egalitarian behaviors in listeners.13  Spe-
cifically, statements that indicate a norm or consensus among a group or that 
activate a pre-existing norm can shift the attitudes expressed by listeners in the 
direction of that statement.14  Even highly prejudiced individuals report lower 
levels of prejudice and more willingness for contact with members of other 
groups after they learn that members of a group they identify with (e.g., fellow 
 
 9. See Rachel I. McDonald & Christian S. Crandall, Social Norms and Social 
Influence, 3 CURRENT OPINION IN BEHAV. SCI. 147, 147 (2015) (“A social norm is an 
expectation about appropriate behavior that occurs in a group context.”).  Economists 
and legal scholars have conceptualized norms somewhat more punitively, emphasizing 
the role of norms in sanctioning individuals for non-conforming conduct.  See, e.g., 
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 338, 340 (1997); Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1095, 1095–97 (1986). 
 10. See McDonald & Crandall, supra note 9, at 147–48. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 367–68 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & 
Gardner Lindzey eds., 1998). 
 13. See, e.g., Margo J. Monteith, Nicole E. Deneen & Gregory D. Tooman, The 
Effect of Social Norm Activation on the Expression of Opinions Concerning Gay Men 
and Blacks, 18 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 267 (2010); Elizabeth Levy Paluck, 
Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media: A Field Experiment in 
Rwanda, 96 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574 (2009); Barbara Masser & Lisa 
Phillips, “What Do Other People Think?” – The Role of Prejudice and Social Norms 
in the Expression of Opinions Against Gay Men, 55 AUSTRALIAN J. OF PSYCHOL. 184 
(2003); Christian S. Crandall, Amy Eshleman & Laurie O’Brien, Social Norms and the 
Expression and Suppression of Prejudice: The Struggle for Internalization, 82 J. OF 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 359, 359 (2002) [hereinafter Crandall, Social Norms]; 
Charles A. Stangor, Gretchen B. Sechrist & John T. Jost, Changing Racial Beliefs by 
Providing Consensus Information, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 486 
(2001); Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Condemning and Condoning Racism: A Social 
Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 993 (1994); Rus-
sell D. Clark III & Anne Maass, The Effects of Majority Size on Minority Influence, 20 
EUROPEAN J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 99 (1990).  See generally Stephanie M. Stern & Daphna 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROPERTY (forthcoming 2019). 
 14. See discussion infra note 105–13. 
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university students) hold unprejudiced attitudes.15  The limited number of stud-
ies that have examined behavior have found that exposure to discriminatory or 
egalitarian social norms about a group also affects listeners’ subsequent behav-
iors and interactions with that group.16  As social psychologists Gretchen Se-
christ and Charles Stangor observe, “If there is any lesson to be learned from 
the history of social psychology, it is that attitudes change not so much through 
persuasive appeals from others or even from direct experience as from percep-
tions about the beliefs of important in-group members.”17 
Viewed through this lens, constraining the appearance of prejudice pro-
motes non-discriminatory norms in real estate transactions.  Research showing 
the effect of even a single statement on listeners’ bias supports the legislative 
decision to deny exemptions to § 3604(c) claims.18  Applying a social norms 
framework to § 3604(c) also makes evident why violations should be judged 
from the standpoint of an “ordinary listener,” which captures the normative 
injury, rather than the standpoint of the speaker’s intent.19  Social norms offer 
a new perspective on controversial FHA cases about extending standing to non-
profit organizations or white residents claiming injuries from segregation.20  
While claiming an effect on social norms cannot be the sole basis of standing 
– such an approach would obliterate standing as a doctrine of restriction – the 
normative injuries from discriminatory housing speech are one factor that sup-
port the generous standing courts have already afforded to fair housing liti-
gants.21 
More globally, the social norms research counsels a shift from viewing 
the purpose of housing speech regulation as solely to address emotional harms 
to members of protected groups or to prevent listeners from misperceiving their 
 
 15. Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences In-
tergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 645, 647–49 (2001). 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 648 (measuring seating distance from an African-American 
following exposure to information that the participant’s fellow students held racist ver-
sus egalitarian views). 
 17. Id. at 645.  Evidence from other studies highlights the role of likeability of the 
person expressing the norm and the social dimensions of groups and social norms.  See, 
e.g., Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of Automatic Racial Attitudes: The Role of 
Affiliative Motivation, 89 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 583, 590–91 (2005). 
 18. See Blanchard et al., supra note 13, at 995–96; Monteith, Deneen & Tooman, 
supra note 13, at 267. 
 19. See, e.g., Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 20. The same theory of social norms supports controversial judicial decisions ex-
tending liability to third-party statements made by people who are not involved in the 
real estate transaction and to statements of agents made at the direction of their princi-
pals.  See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372–79 (1982). 
 21. For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see Schwemm, supra note 5, 
at 294–300. 
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legal obligations under the FHA.22  Housing speech regulation also performs a 
task critical to the FHA’s goal of promoting integration: it promotes social 
norms against expressing housing prejudice in words or deeds.23 
Social norms research has implications as well for contemporary debates 
about housing speech.  Recently, § 3604(c) has fulminated debate over its ap-
plication to the Internet in online housing advertisements and posts.24  The prej-
udice-reducing power of communications highlights the welfare gains that 
should be measured against internet providers’ interests in determining liability 
for discriminatory housing posts on websites and raises concerns about court 
decisions greatly cabining liability under the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”).25  A social norm framework also challenges the widely-accepted no-
tion that associational rights should trump housing speech regulation when 
people advertise for roommates.26  It is not clear why the interest in selecting a 
roommate outweighs normative harm from discriminatory advertisements, par-
ticularly because the person advertising may lawfully decline a roommate or 
home-sharer on the basis of a protected characteristic under exemptions in the 
FHA. 
This Article presents an empirically grounded model of social norms in 
housing speech regulation.  It unfolds in six parts.  Part I describes the surpris-
ing robustness of § 3604(c) in light of the legislative history of the FHA and 
the social costs of this provision.  Part II explores the extensive psychology 
research on the effect of discriminatory statements on prejudice.  Part III argues 
that the impact of discriminatory housing speech on social norms provides a 
 
 22. See, e.g., Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating 
that without regulation of housing speech, readers and listeners are vulnerable to con-
fusion about housing discrimination law). 
 23. Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1160–62 (“Regardless of whether a particular group 
is harmed more than another by a social norm, it may still be important for the law to 
express society’s disapproval of that norm.”); see also, e.g., Fair Housing Issues in the 
Gulf Coast in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and Rita: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Financial Ser-
vices, 119th Cong. 6–7 (2006) (statement of assistant secretary of HUD Kim Kendrick 
that discriminatory advertisements following Hurricane Katrina inflicted harm on those 
who had already suffered). 
 24. See Andrew J. Crossett, Unfair Housing on the Internet: The Effect of the Com-
munications Decency Act on the Fair Housing Act, 73 MO. L. REV. 195, 206–11 (2008) 
(discussing limits on fair housing enforcement under the Communications Decency 
Act); Jean E. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 
WASHBURN L. J. 149, 149–60 (1969) (describing difficult legislative path to enact-
ment); see also Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1153–80 (collecting data and assessing dis-
criminatory roommate advertisements on an internet site). 
 25. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roomates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 
2008) (finding that website operator who “materially contributed” to the discriminatory 
posting cannot enjoy immunity); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, 
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006): see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 
(2018). 
 26. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1157–60. 
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potent justification for § 3604(c).  Part IV describes how seeming puzzles of    
§ 3604, including the non-applicability of FHA exemptions, lack of an intent 
requirement, and broad standing, are no longer surprising in view of the strong 
normative effects of discriminatory statements.  Part V notes some of the lim-
itations of social norms for fair housing and the goal of residential integration.  
Turning to recent controversies, Part VI addresses the implications of social 
norms research for website providers’ liability for discriminatory housing 
statements posted on their websites and the debate over § 3604(c)’s applicabil-
ity to roommate advertisements. 
I. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT’S REGULATION OF HOUSING STATEMENTS 
The FHA27 was enacted in 1968 amid growing concern about racial seg-
regation and African-American ghettos.28  Racial segregation in housing had 
burgeoned in the real estate industry, as landlords, sellers, brokers, and lenders 
refused to transact with African-Americans, Jews, and other groups.29  Gov-
ernment “redlining” had also narrowed opportunities for minorities by system-
atically undervaluing properties in inner-city neighborhoods.30  Political organ-
izations, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (“NAACP”) and the National Committee Against Discrimination began 
to lobby, unsuccessfully, for housing civil rights legislation in the early 
1960s.31  Following a number of urban riots, President Lyndon B. Johnson ap-
pointed a group, known as the Kerner Commission, to study the causes of civil 
unrest.32  The Kerner Commission cited housing segregation and discrimina-
tion and it recommended that Congress adopt anti-discrimination housing leg-
islation.33 
 
 27. Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. ch. 45). 
 28. Schwemm, supra note 5, at 189–91; Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 
1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOC. F. 571, 571–74 (2015). 
 29. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 46–50 (1993). 
 30. Id. at 52.  Redlining is the practice of denying or limiting mortgages and other 
financial services to certain neighborhoods, often on the basis of race, regardless of 
individual applicants’ credit-worthiness.  Id. 
 31. Valerie Schneider, In Defense of Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelopment and 
the Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in the Fair Housing Act, 79 MO. L. REV. 539, 552 
(2014). 
 32. Id. at 553. 
 33. Id.; see also John Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner 
Commission in Retrospect – An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1299–300 (1993). 
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The FHA initially struggled to gain traction for passage.34  The House 
passed a fair housing bill in 1966, and the Senate sponsored a bill in 1967.35  In 
1968, Senators Walter Mondale and Edward Brooke offered a fair housing 
amendment to a more general civil rights bill passed by the House, which was 
withdrawn in favor of a fair housing amendment by Senator Everett McKinley 
Dirksen.  Senator Dirksen’s amendment became the basis of the FHA.36  A few 
days after the assassination of Martin Luther King, the House passed the 
FHA.37  The goals of the statute, as elucidated in its legislative history and 
subsequent interpretation by the United States Supreme Court, were to reduce 
discrimination and advance integration – particularly racial integration be-
tween African-Americans and whites.38  These goals will feature prominently 
in this Article’s analysis of the normative benefits of housing speech regula-
tion. 
The FHA prohibits discriminatory housing statements, as well as discrim-
ination in housing transactions and lending.  Specifically, the FHA forbids re-
fusals to rent or sell a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status, disability, or national origin,39 as well as discrimination in the “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of a sale or rental.”40  The FHA also makes discrimi-
nation by individuals and entities engaged in residential real estate transactions, 
such as brokers and lenders, unlawful.41 
A. Regulating Housing Speech: Section 3604(c) 
One provision of the FHA, however, addresses neither behavior nor dis-
crimination in a transaction.  Section 3604(c) makes it unlawful to “make, 
print, or publish . . . any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the 
sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrim-
ination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national 
 
 34. See Dubofsky, supra note 24, at 149–60; Margaret A. Fiorino, Advertising for 
Apartheid: The Use of All White Models in Marketing Real Estate as a Violation of the 
Fair Housing Act, 56 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1988) (describing objections 
to “coercion, violation of the fundamental freedom to own and dispose of private prop-
erty, and anti-majoritarianism” in the FHA’s legislative history). 
 35. Schwemm, supra note 5, at 197–98. 
 36. Id. at 198. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 212.  The United States Supreme Court has emphasized integration as a 
major goal of the FHA.  In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 
205 (1972), the Court held that white residents of an apartment complex had standing 
to sue for injuries from segregation due to their landlord’s discrimination against Afri-
can-Americans.  This holding recognizes the harms from segregation to both African-
Americans and whites and, implicitly, the benefits of integration envisioned under the 
FHA. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2018). 
 40. Id. § 3604(f)(2). 
 41. See id. § 3605. 
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origin.”42  This provision regulates both oral and written housing statements.  
For example, an advertisement by a landlord in a local newspaper that states 
“black female tenant preferred” violates the FHA, as does the same statement 
made face-to-face to applicants.  Courts have also held that the FHA applies to 
pictures, such as the use of all-white models, that indicate a racial preference 
to the ordinary reader.43 
The FHA imposes liability on the person making discriminatory state-
ments as well as on publishers of discriminatory statements, such as newspa-
pers, radio, or television.44  In the case of discriminatory internet postings – for 
example, on online housing or roommate matching websites – the CDA typi-
cally shields operators of internet sites and online services from liability for 
posting discriminatory statements about housing but does not shield the indi-
vidual who posted the statement online.45  Complainants include fair housing 
organizations, who search for discriminatory advertisements and use volunteer 
or hired fair housing “testers” to pose as housing applicants, and private parties 
who were subjected to discriminatory housing advertisements and oral state-
ments.46  The remedies for a § 3604(c) claim are actual damages for emotional 
harms and expenses (e.g., greater housing search costs) as a result of reading 
or hearing the discriminatory statement and punitive damages; injunctive and 
equitable relief are also available.47  For cases tried in an administrative pro-
ceeding or by the U.S. attorney general, the defendant may face additional civil 
penalties.48 
 
 42. See id. § 3604(c). 
 43. See, e.g., Saunders v. Gen. Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1058 (E.D. Va. 
1987).  For further analysis of § 3604(c)’s application to pictorial advertisements and 
models, see Fiorino, supra note 34, at 1433–43; Ivan C. Smith, Comment, Discrimina-
tory Use of Models in Housing Advertisement: The Ordinary Black Reader Standard, 
54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1521, 1527–34 (1993). 
 44. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (1972) (holding a newspaper liable 
for publishing discriminatory housing advertisement).  This has dramatically reduced 
such advertisements in print and other non-internet media.  See Andrene N. Plummer, 
Comment, A Few New Solutions to a Very Old Problem: How the Fair Housing Act 
Can Be Improved to Deter Discriminatory Conduct by Real Estate Brokers, 47 HOW. 
L. J. 163, 177 (2003). 
 45. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
 46. Fred Freiberg, A Test of Our Fairness, 41 URB. LAW. 239, 240–41 (2009); 
Fiorino, supra note 34, at 1433–43. 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (2018) (enforcement by a private person); id. § 3612 
(g)(3) (enforcement by Secretary); id. § 3614(d)(1)(A)–(B) (enforcement by Attorney 
General); see also Schwemm, supra note 5, at 302–09. 
 48. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3)(A)–(C) (administrative proceedings); id. § 
3614(d)(1)(C) (federal suit by attorney general); see also The FHEO Complaint and 
Investigation Process, HUD, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_hous-
ing_equal_opp/complaint-process (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).  See generally 
SCHWEMM, supra note 6. 
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Section 3604(c) was a surprising addition to the FHA in a number of re-
spects.  In a bill that barely eked its way to legislation, an expansive provision 
regulating commercial speech seems anomalous.  Section 3604(c) not only sur-
vived a contentious legislative process, but it emerged with arguably greater 
strength and certainly broader reach than other parts of the FHA.  Section 
3604(c) takes a strict liability approach to discriminatory housing statements.  
Thus, unlike the FHA provisions addressing discriminatory refusals to rent, 
sell, or lend,49 § 3604(c) does not require that a discriminatory action (e.g., 
refusal to extend housing) occurred.50 
Section 3604(c) does not even require the speaker to intend discrimina-
tion.  The statutory language requires only that the speaker “indicates any pref-
erence, limitation, or discrimination based on [a protected status],”51 unlike 
other sections of the FHA that require plaintiffs to show that the alleged dis-
criminatory act occurred “because of” their membership in a protected group.52  
In § 3604(c) claims, courts determine violations based on whether an ordinary 
listener would perceive discrimination based on membership in protected 
group.53  For example, a landlord who publishes an advertisement stating that 
an apartment is best suited for a couple without children has likely violated       
§ 3604(c) even if he did not intend to exclude families and has rented to fami-
lies with children in the past.  It would be irrelevant to a § 3604(c) claim if, 
following publication of the advertisement, the landlord ultimately rented the 
apartment to a family with young children. 
Compared to other provisions of the FHA, § 3604(c) imposes broader li-
ability because the exemptions applicable to other provisions of the FHA do 
not apply to housing statements.  Discrimination in rentals and sales is subject 
to an expansive exemption for small-scale landlords.  The federal “Mrs. Mur-
phy” provision exempts dwelling units or rooms in a four-unit or fewer multi-
family dwelling where the owner occupies one dwelling unit as her residence 
from liability for discrimination in rentals and sales.54  Approximately half of 
the states have adopted Mrs. Murphy exemptions identical to the federal ap-
proach; most of the remaining states make the exemption more limited (e.g., 
limiting the Mrs. Murphy exemption to owner-occupants of two-unit buildings 
 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (refusal to sell or rent); id § 3604(b) (discrimination in 
terms, conditions, or services of sale or rental); id. § 3605 (discrimination by businesses 
engaged in lending, selling, brokering, constructing, repairing, or improving, or ap-
praising residential real estate). 
 50. Id. § 3604(c). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. § 3604(a); id § 3604(b); id § 3604(d); id § 3605(a). 
 53. See, e.g., Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995); Soules v. HUD, 
967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir.  
1991); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2). 
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rather than four or fewer units).55  There is another exemption for landlords or 
sellers of single-family homes if the owner does not own more than three sin-
gle-family homes and does not use a real estate broker or agent.56  However, 
the FHA provides that these exemptions do not apply to claims under                    
§ 3604(c).57  This means that, under federal law, a Mrs. Murphy may discrim-
inatorily refuse to rent to a Latino tenant with impunity but cannot advertise 
that preference in her local newspaper.  This is an awkward result that has gen-
erated critique.  For example, one housing scholar has argued in favor of sub-
jecting § 3604(c) to the Mrs. Murphy exemption, noting that there is “some-
thing a little backward about a regime in which particular conduct is permitted, 
but statements of intent to commit that conduct are not.”58 
The other major exemptions in the FHA are for private clubs and religious 
organizations.59  These organizations may limit the sale, rental, or occupancy 
of dwellings that they own or operate on the basis of religion, gender, and other 
characteristics but not on the basis of race, color, or national origin.60  This 
provision allows private clubs and religious organizations to restrict member-
ship on the basis of some characteristics otherwise protected under the FHA.61  
However, the exemption applies to “sale, rental, or occupancy” and does not 
apply to advertisements, notices, and other housing statements covered under 
§ 3604(c).62  Fair housing scholar Robert Schwemm’s excavation of the legis-
lative history, the enactment, and the subsequent judicial interpretation of            
§ 3604(c) notes that no reported case has extended the exemptions for private 
clubs and religious organizations to a § 3604(c) claim.63  There is only one part 
of the FHA, a narrow provision for familial status claims against senior hous-
ing, that is not subject to § 3604(c).64  In general, courts have tended to construe 
 
 55. See Scott M. Badami, The FHA’s “Mrs. Murphy” Exemption – A 50 State 
Guide, FAIR HOUSING DEF. (Apr. 22, 2013), https://fairhousing.foxroth-
schild.com/2013/04/articles/fha-basics/the-fhas-mrs-murphy-exemption-a-50-state-
guide/.  For examples of state statutes that limit the state’s exemption to two-unit owner 
occupied residential buildings see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.365 (West 2018); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (2018). 
 56. Id. § 3603(b)(1). 
 57. Id. § 3603(b). 
 58. Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1165. 
 59. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607. 
 60. Id. § 3607(a). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. There is at least one mention in the legislative history of an intent to exempt    
§ 3604(c) to shield religious and fraternal organizations, but it does not appear crystal-
lized and has not been heeded by the courts.  Schwemm, supra note 5, at 196 n.31. 
 64. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(ii).  This provision actually requires the hous-
ing providers to publish and follow policies demonstrating their intent to house people 
fifty-five years of age or older.  Id. 
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/7
2019] A SOCIAL NORM THEORY OF REGULATING HOUSING  445 
the exemptions narrowly for all kinds of claims brought under the FHA.65  Sec-
tion 3604(c), by virtue of its explicit exclusion from the exemptions, is most 
benefited.66  However, a recent development that has undermined § 3604(c)’s 
impact is the CDA’s protection of internet website operators from liability for 
discriminatory posts and advertisements by users on their sites. 
The application of § 3604(c) to small-scale landlords and roommate ad-
vertisements and its eschewal of intent have provoked public consternation.  In 
some cases, such as “mom and pop” landlords or roommate seekers, speakers 
mistakenly believe it is lawful to express preferences on the basis of protected 
characteristics.67  Punishing ambiguous housing speech without evidence of 
intent or actual discrimination may also deplete political support for fair hous-
ing regulation and cultivate the sentiment that, as one reporter opined, “weak 
[words] can cost you.”68  An example of such a case comes from Bader v. Fair 
Housing Council of Orange County, litigation that ensued when the Orange 
County, California, fair housing authority fined a small-scale landlord $4,000 
and required him to attend a course on fair housing.69  Bader, the landlord, had 
posted a Craigslist advertisement describing his 480 square foot apartment as 
“well-suited for 1 or 2 professional adults.”70  To no avail, Bader vigorously 
argued in court, and to the press, that he had not intended discrimination based 
on familial status and in fact had rented the apartment to families with children 
multiple times in the past.71  While Bader did not prevail in court, his case 
attracted media attention and negative publicity for the local fair housing 
agency.72 
B. Costs and Challenges of Housing Speech Regulation 
In addition to the problems of public acceptance and backlash noted 
above, regulation of discriminatory housing statements limits speech, imposes 
enforcement costs, and possibly shifts, rather than reduces, discriminatory ac-
tivity.  The enactment and maintenance of § 3604(c) is even more startling in 
light of its costs.  These costs underscore the importance of the nature and mag-
nitude of § 3604(c)’s countervailing benefits.  This Section considers some of 
the costs of the FHA’s regulation of discriminatory housing speech. 
 
 65. E.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1995). 
 66. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 883 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Schwemm, supra note 5, at 196 n.31 (noting that the Mrs. Murphy, single-
family home, private club, and religious organization exemptions have “rarely suc-
ceeded in shielding FHA defendants from liability”). 
 67. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1167. 
 68. See Brian Joseph, Unfair Fight?, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Mar. 28, 2008), 
https://www.ocregister.com/2008/03/28/unfair-fight/. 
 69. No. G041118, 2010 WL 740185, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2010). 
 70. See id. at *2. 
 71. Id. at *3; Joseph, supra note 68. 
 72. See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 68. 
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1. Free Speech 
Section 3604(c) imposes liability for both written and oral speech.73  In 
doing so, it affects the important constitutional right (and political tinderbox) 
of the First Amendment.  Section 3604(c) regulates commercial speech, which 
is entitled to a lower standard of protection than non-commercial speech.74  In 
virtually all § 3604(c) cases, there has been no constitutional violation under 
the United States Supreme Court precedent in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission.75  Central Hudson creates a four-part test 
to determine the constitutionality of government regulation of commercial 
speech, with the first prong of the test requiring that the speech “must concern 
lawful activity” to receive First Amendment protection.76  Because the housing 
discrimination underlying § 3604(c) speech is illegal under the FHA, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, and usually state or local housing law as well, discrimina-
tory housing statements do not concern a lawful activity and thus are not pro-
tected speech.77  The rationale for excluding speech about unlawful activity 
from the auspices of First Amendment protection is that such speech is unlikely 
to provide the kind of full, accurate market of information that the First Amend-
ment seeks to preserve in commercial speech cases.78  Courts that have consid-
ered First Amendment challenges to § 3604(c) have rejected those claims.79 
While it passes constitutional muster, § 3604(c) causes a substantial de-
gree of constitutional discomfort.  This occurs in two ways.  First, the animat-
ing ideals of the First Amendment support a default position of protecting free 
speech – both personal or political speech and to a lesser extent commercial 
speech.80  This sentiment underlies resistance and political upset over housing 
statement regulation.81  Interestingly, one reason for supporting freedom to en-
gage in discriminatory or hateful speech is the idea that hearing such speech 
 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2018). 
 74. Samuel A. DiLullo, The Present Status of Commercial Speech: Looking for a 
Clear Definition, 90 DICK. L. REV. 705, 705–06 (1986). 
 75. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 76. Id. at 566. 
 77. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 273–76. 
 78. See id. at 272–78. 
 79. See, e.g., Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002–05 (2d Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211–15 (4th Cir. 1972).  The cases where courts 
have raised First Amendment concerns have involved statements unrelated to the hous-
ing transaction or cases where the facts make unclear if the statement indicated dis-
crimination against a protected group.  See, e.g., Stewart v. Furton, 774 F.2d 706, 710 
n.2 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 80. See DiLullo, supra note 74, at 705–06. 
 81. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 5, at 85–101 (arguing that the government does 
not have a constitutionally legitimate interest in eradicating discriminatory expressions 
or attitudes). 
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will change listeners’ minds in the opposite direction.82  The psychology re-
search suggests that this is unlikely to occur if listeners perceive the speaker as 
representing a consensus view or a group with whom they identify.83  Yet, other 
rationales for free speech protection, including safeguarding personal liberty 
and the flow of information, remain and create tension over housing speech 
regulation.84 
The political consternation over First Amendment rights and potential 
over-reach is evident in the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (“HUD”) regulations, which were adopted following political outcry over 
a HUD investigation.  HUD investigated three residents who used petitions and 
newsletters to advocate against a homeless center in part on the basis of the 
disabled status of the residents the center would serve.85  The investigation 
sought to determine whether the residents had violated the FHA, including          
§ 3617, which makes it unlawful to threaten or interfere with a housing trans-
action because of a protected status.86  Media publicity about the investigation 
galvanized public backlash.87  Although HUD ultimately found that the resi-
dents were expressing their political beliefs and influencing the political pro-
cess, the controversy led the agency to issue guidelines defining the scope of 
its authority.88  The guidance clarifies that under FHA § 3617 speech directed 
toward achieving action by a government official or entity is protected under 
the First Amendment so long as it does not involve force or threats.89  It also 
delineates steps the agency must take to “make every effort to assure” that 
chilling of speech does not occur and to withdraw agency investigations when 
it becomes apparent that First Amendment protections apply.90  While this 
guidance does not address § 3604(c) specifically, First Amendment concerns 
in housing speech investigations are likely similar. 
 
 82. See John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1341–54 
(2008) (conceptualizing communication as behaviors intended to change minds 
through the free will of the listener). 
 83. See infra Part II. 
 84. For further discussion on this point, see infra Section III.B. 
 85. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 86. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2018). 
 87. For more detail on this controversy, see Michael P. Seng, Hate Speech and 
Enforcement of the Fair Housing Laws, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 409–10 (1996); 
but see Bernstein, supra note 5, at 134–38 (describing HUD as making a wrongful pre-
liminary finding and intimidating the residents). 
 88. See White, 227 F.3d at 1228. 
 89. HUD, NOTICE FHEO-2015-01, SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS 
ON FILING AND INVESTIGATING FAIR HOUSING ACT COMPLAINTS THAT MAY IMPLICATE 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–2 (2015). 
 90. Id. at 3. 
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Second, many residential real estate transactions implicate interests in 
freedom of association and involve individual owners without particular busi-
ness or legal expertise.91  A retired homeowner advertising to rent a room or 
basement apartment in his house or a college student seeking a roommate via 
a campus posting are not what comes to many people’s minds when they think 
of “commercial speech.”  The prototypical commercial transaction does not 
require ongoing physical proximity and interaction once the transaction is com-
plete.  Of course, many aspects of residential real estate transactions – such as 
lending, rentals that are not owner-occupied, development, and brokering – do 
not entail ongoing associational interests.  What makes § 3604(c) controversial 
on free speech grounds are contexts that implicate associational concerns or 
involve a hybrid of commercial and non-commercial speech. 
Regulating housing statements within the bounds of the First Amendment 
creates complexity and uncertainty for litigants and courts.  For example, 
courts have had to consider whether statements made during, but not in refer-
ence to, a real estate action give rise to a claim under the FHA and have de-
clined to extend liability in part due to First Amendment concerns.92  A linger-
ing question has been whether the benefits of § 3604(c) justify the costs to not 
only free speech but also to clarity, certainty, and judicial administration. 
2. Policy Targeting 
The FHA was designed with limited resources for enforcement.  Indeed, 
enforcement power was a sticking point during the enactment process.93  Hous-
ing scholars Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton describe weak enforcement 
as “the price of passage.”94  The FHA provides three paths to legal relief: suits 
by private parties, administrative complaints to HUD, and, in cases involving 
a pattern or practice or issue of public importance, enforcement by the U.S. 
attorney general.95  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and HUD have limited 
 
 91. Most landlords own only a single property.  See FOREMOST INSURANCE 
GROUP, LANDLORD MARKET FACTS 3 (2014), https://cp.foremost.com/market-
facts/9012548-landlord-market-facts-2014.pdf. 
 92. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 276. 
 93. See id. at 203–05.  In particular, the infamous “Dirksen Compromise” garnered 
Senator Dirksen’s needed vote in exchange for granting HUD only conciliation and 
persuasion powers.  For more detail on this and other concessions on enforcement, see 
Dubofsky, supra note 24, at 149–60. 
 94. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 29, at 195.  But see Jonathan Zasloff, The 
Secret History of the Fair Housing Act, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 247, 248 (2016) (con-
cluding that legislators’ intentions for the FHA’s robust operation and enforcement 
were not as tepid as scholars have alleged). 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2018) (private person); id. § 3610 (administrative enforce-
ment); id. § 3614 (enforcement by attorney general). 
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staff and resources to enforce the FHA, including § 3604(c).96  The FHA par-
tially alleviates the federal burden by requiring HUD to refer housing discrim-
ination complaints to a state or local public agency with jurisdiction so long as 
the applicable rights, procedures, and remedies are substantially equivalent to 
the FHA.97  The FHA also requires HUD to attempt “conciliation” and volun-
tary resolution of complaints.98  Given the limitations of federal enforcement, 
the primary means of enforcing the FHA is through private litigation by indi-
vidual plaintiffs and fair housing organizations.99  Non-profit housing organi-
zations are responsible for most of the major judicial decisions clarifying, and 
in some cases extending, the FHA.100 
In some cases, § 3604(c) may consume enforcement resources or divert 
them from allegations of discriminatory acts to seemingly less injurious, or less 
certain to be injurious, discriminatory statements.  For example, a fair housing 
agency investigating a discriminatory advertisement might instead devote 
those resources to substantive discrimination cases or greater enforcement of 
the FHA’s provision that localities “affirmatively further fair housing” – a pro-
vision that saw brief enforcement attempts during the Obama era.101  In prac-
tice, most – but not all – cases with a § 3604(c) claim also involve additional 
claims for discriminatory refusal to rent or sell or discrimination in the terms 
and conditions of a real estate transaction.102  This reduces the cost of investi-
gating and enforcing § 3604(c) because the various claims include shared facts 
and, if litigated, are presented together in a single case.  Also, fair housing 
organizations, who are de facto the primary enforcers of the FHA, can choose 
 
 96. See Massey, supra note 28, at 583.  For example, Bill Lann Lee writes that, 
while the attorney general has brought important cases, federal resources and federal 
authority, particularly prior to the 1988 amendments to the FHA, “was far from pow-
erful or complete.”  Bill Lann Lee, An Issue of Public Importance: The Justice Depart-
ment’s Enforcement of The Fair Housing Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.jus-
tice.gov/crt/issue-public-importance (last updated Aug. 6, 2015). 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f)(3). 
 98. Id. § 3610(b). 
 99. See Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 375 (1988) (“The [FHA] is designed to rely primarily on 
private enforcement.”); see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 
(“[C]omplaints by private persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with 
the [FHA].”). 
 100. See Schwemm, supra note 99, at 381–82. 
 101. Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: 
A Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively Further” 
Mandate, 100 KENTUCKY L. J. 154, 176 (2012).  See generally Jonathon Sheffield, At 
Forty-Five Years Old the Obligation to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing Gets a 
Face-List, But Will It Integrate America’s Cities?, 25 U. FLA. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 71 
(2014); Michelle Ghaznavi Collins, Opening Doors to Fair Housing: Enforcing the 
Affirmatively Further Provision of the Fair Housing Act Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 2135, 2167–68 (2010). 
 102. I thank fair housing scholar Robert Schwemm for his helpful comments on 
this point. 
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to prioritize fair lending, steering, or other cases over housing speech com-
plaints.  More fundamentally, the view that § 3604(c) creates problematic mis-
allocations assumes that § 3604(c) is a less effective provision of the FHA and 
thus less worthy of enforcement resources – a claim that this Article will dis-
pute in Parts II and III. 
3. Discrimination Distortion 
The regulation of housing speech may cause discrimination to morph into 
other forms.  For example, following the enactment of the FHA, real estate 
advertisements often eschewed written or oral statements and instead adver-
tised photographs and other media using all-white models as buyers, tenants, 
or borrowers.103  Forbidden from statements of racial preference, the use of all-
white models conveyed the same message with legal impunity.  Judicial opin-
ions subsequently restricted the use of all-white models in cases of repeated 
and numerous advertisements by an advertiser.104  Thorny questions remain 
about where to draw the line on white model frequency and whether to aggre-
gate different advertisements run by the same publisher to determine publisher 
liability.105  Courts have refused to extend liability to publishers based on ag-
gregate advertisements.106 
Businesses, advertisers, and publishers can adapt, usually quite rapidly, 
to convey their intended message via lawful alternatives.  Restricting discrim-
inatory written advertisements and images may give rise to other, subtler ways 
of signaling preferences.  For example, legal scholar Lior Strahilevitz theorizes 
that by incorporating and advertising “exclusionary amenities” associated with 
certain racial or other types of groups, developers and owners can attract the 
type of buyer they prefer.107  This can occur in localities, neighborhoods, or 
common interest communities.  For example, a subdivision development may 
 
 103. See, e.g., Ragin v. N.Y. Times, Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that § 3604(c) applies to use of models to express racial preference). 
 104. See, e.g., Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1000 (holding that § 3604(c) applies to use of 
models to express racial preference); see also Fiorino, supra note 34, at 1431–36. 
 105. When there is an insufficient number of all-white model advertisements from 
a single advertiser for a viable § 3604(c) claim, litigants have sought to hold publishers 
liable based on the fact that all of the publication’s advertisements, viewed in the ag-
gregate, display white models exclusively or near-exclusively.  See, e.g., Ragin, 923 
F.2d at 1002; Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 
F.2d 644, 648, 653 (6th Cir. 1991); cf. Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits 
of the Fair Housing Act: The Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of 
Neighborhood Purity, and the Master Narrative of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 69, 155–59 (1995) (arguing for image equality by publishers and extension of 
FHA liability to aggregate white advertisements from different sources to combat the 
narrative of white superiority). 
 106. See, e.g., Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1002; Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc., 943 
F.2d at 648, 653. 
 107. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 
92 VA. L. REV. 437, 450–79 (2006). 
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add golf courses and clubs, which are historically associated with whites, to 
attract buyers who prefer a white residential environment and to dissuade po-
tential minority buyers.108  The willingness to pay for the golf course, or other 
shared “club” goods associated with or attractive to a specific group, functions 
as a sorting device.109  Although the FHA prohibits direct advertisements or 
statements of exclusion by developers, buyers can still purchase “the ‘benefits’ 
of exclusion” of groups otherwise protected by fair housing law by seeking out 
residential communities with exclusionary amenities.110 
In the social media era, prejudice and discrimination can also shift from 
discriminatory oral statements and newspaper advertisements to social media 
sites and posts.  This can occur directly when landlords or buyers eschew ex-
plicit discrimination in a printed advertisement and instead advertise housing 
on social media to a network of “friends” who are exclusively or predominantly 
from groups favored by the poster.  The morphing of discrimination can also 
occur as people who face liability for discriminatory housing speech instead 
express animus and prejudice on social media indirectly and somewhat more 
subtly.  For example, a person who cannot lawfully post a “for rent whites 
only” sign on their lawn can instead express prejudice by posting a confederate 
flag on her social media page. 
The issue is not merely that discrimination has changed forms.  It is that 
these forms of discrimination may be more harmful, costly, or legally complex 
to redress.  Section 3604(c), like all legal rules, creates incentives and channels 
behavior.  This observation does not condemn § 3604(c) but rather underscores 
the question: why regulate discriminatory housing statements? 
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS AND PREJUDICE 
The power of social norms to reduce the expression of prejudice and dis-
crimination is an important justification for § 3604(c)’s sometimes costly reg-
ulation of housing speech.  Discriminatory housing statements shape the per-
ceived norms of landlords, sellers, lenders, and other housing market partici-
pants.  Social norms operate through our beliefs about how others think and 
 
 108. See id. at 464–76.  Other legal scholars have also theorized about the informa-
tional and focal effects of symbols, such as Eric Posner who theorizes that people con-
form to in order to signal cooperative behavior and enable cooperation.  See Eric A. 
Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
765, 767 (1998). 
 109. See Strahilevitz, supra note 107, at 441–43.  Beginning in the 1990s there was 
a staggering increase in golf course development, id. at 468, which corresponded with 
African-American migration into the suburbs, id. at 466.  While factors other than ex-
clusionary amenities may explain the increase in golf courses, Strahilevitz notes that 
several aspects of the growth of golf developments are consistent with exclusionary 
amenities as one motivating factor.  See id. at 469. 
 110. Id. at 442. 
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act, regardless of whether our beliefs are accurate.111  The effect of norms is so 
robust that even a single communication that suggests a social norm influences 
listeners’ prejudice and behavior.112  There is even evidence that exposure to a 
social norm affects automatic, unconscious racial attitudes.113  Social norms 
expressed in housing advertisements and statements indicate the frequency and 
the acceptability of prejudice and discrimination in housing.114 
A seminal work in social norm psychology, Sherif and Sherif’s Group 
Norm Theory, describes prejudice forming primarily in relation to social norms 
that become standardized “common property” of the group.115  Sherif and She-
rif describe a socialization process whereby “[t]he individual’s major social 
attitudes are formed in relation to group norms.”116  Social norm theory is 
highly influential in psychology and research; however, it is hardly the only 
theory of the cause of prejudice.  It is unlikely that there is a unitary root that 
accounts for all instances of prejudice.  Other theories, for example, describe 
prejudice as stemming from the need to conserve cognitive resources through 
categorization or an “authoritarian” personality type.117  Comparing these fac-
tors, research by Thomas Pettigrew indicates that social norms play a stronger 
role than authoritarian personality or childhood influences.118 
 
 111. Mirroring the psychological research, prejudice in this Article refers to nega-
tive attitudes or affects toward a group or an individual based on group membership 
and discrimination refers to behaviors on the basis of these categorical evaluations.  See 
Fiske, supra note 12, at 357 (“[S]tereotyping is taken as the most cognitive component, 
prejudice as the most affective component, and discrimination as the most behavioral 
component of category-based reactions . . . .”).  See generally Crandall, Social Norms, 
supra note 13, at 359. 
 112. Fiske, supra note 12, at 367–68. 
 113. Sinclair et al., supra note 17, at 590–91.  Researchers measured the effect of 
social norms on unconscious bias using a psychological test call the Implicit Associa-
tion Test (“IAT”).  Id. at 584. 
 114. Robert Cialdini and his colleagues divide norms into two categories.  Robert 
B. Cialdini, Raymond R. Reno & Carl A. Kallgren, A Focus Theory of Normative Con-
duct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. OF 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015 (1990).  Descriptive norms provide infor-
mation about the frequency or typicality of an attitude or behavior and help people to 
choose and behave “accurately.”  Id.  Injunctive norms provide information about the 
degree of social approval or disapproval toward a behavior.  Id.  Knowing the injunctive 
norms of a group helps to secure social approval and acceptance within that group.  Id.  
This typology maps imperfectly to discriminatory housing statements.  Discriminatory 
advertisements and housing statement appear to convey both elements of information 
(frequency of housing discrimination) and injunction (do or do not discriminate). 
 115. See MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS 124 (1936).  She-
rif concluded that “the attitude of prejudice is a product of group membership.”  Id. at 
66. 
 116. See MUZAFER SHERIF & CAROLYN W. SHERIF, GROUPS IN HARMONY AND 
TENSION 202–03 (1953). 
 117. See Fiske, supra note 12, at 358–63. 
 118. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, Regional Differences in Anti-Negro Prejudice, 59 J. 
OF ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 28, 28–30 (1959) [hereinafter Pettigrew, Regional 
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The information communicated to people about prejudiced beliefs held 
by a group they find desirable can substantially shift listeners’ prejudices.  A 
study by Charles Stangor, Gretchen Sechrist, and John Jost demonstrates how 
manipulating consensus information can shift the attitudes that people subse-
quently express in the direction of the perceived consensus.119  In this study, a 
group of European-American University of Maryland students estimated the 
percentage of African-Americans who possess nineteen stereotypical traits, 
both positive and negative.120  The students created a second set of identical 
ratings based on how they believed other students at University of Maryland 
viewed African-Americans.121  One week later, the experimenter shared infor-
mation with those students about the percentage of other university students 
who believed African-Americans possessed each of the traits.122  This infor-
mation was engineered so that the participants received information about other 
students’ views that was more positive than each participant’s individual initial 
ratings.123  Then, the students provided a final rating of their beliefs by com-
pleting the same stereotype questionnaire used in the first session.124  The re-
searchers found that participants reported fewer negative stereotypes and more 
positive ones after learning that their fellow students viewed African-Ameri-
cans positively.125  Conversely, when experimenters told a second group that 
their fellow students had negative beliefs about African-Americans, those par-
ticipants reported more negative stereotypes but not a lower probability of pos-
itive stereotypes.126  The magnitude of the participants’ reported attitude 
change was substantial.127  Studies that have similarly manipulated information 
about the “majority” opinion on gay rights have found similar shifts in attitudes 
based on the communication of norms.128 
Even people who are highly prejudiced are susceptible to normative in-
fluence and report reduced prejudice following exposure to egalitarian norms.  
In a mock jury experiment, Bernd Wittenbrink and Julia Henley sorted research 
participants into “high prejudice” and “low prejudice” categories based on their 
 
Differences]; Thomas F. Pettigrew, Personality and Sociocultural Factors in Inter-
group Attitudes: A Cross-National Comparison, 2 J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 29, 35–
40 (1958). 
 119. Stangor, Sechrist & Jost, supra note 13, at 486–87.  The students were enrolled 
in an introductory psychology class at University of Maryland.  Id. at 488. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 488–89. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 489. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 493. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  In the view of Stangor, Sechrist and Jost, manipulating consensus infor-
mation is more effective than attempts to lessen prejudice through contact with mem-
bers of differing groups or appeals to morality.  See id. at 486; cf. GORDON ALLPORT, 
THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 10 (1954). 
 128. See Clark & Maass, supra note 13, at 99. 
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scores on a psychological test entitled the Modern Racism Scale.129  One group 
received biased response scales, which indicated that others thought that a high 
proportion of African-Americans have negative traits, while a second group of 
participants received information indicating that others thought a high propor-
tion of African Americans have positive traits.130  After receiving positive in-
formation, the participants who initially tested as high in racial prejudice re-
ported more favorable attitudes toward African-Americans than those who re-
ceived negative information.131  The participants also reported a more positive 
evaluation of a hypothetical African-American defendant accused of armed 
robbery.132  The low-prejudice participants showed no effects from either pos-
itive or negative information, which suggests that the need to conform was not 
the sole reason for attitude changes.133 
Perhaps the most intriguing evidence of social norms comes from a field 
study of the effect of anti-conflict and egalitarian messages delivered through 
a radio soap opera.134  A 2009 study in Rwanda by Elizabeth Levy Paluck as-
sessed the impact of a radio soap opera whose storyline and characters paral-
leled the history of the Tutsis and Hutus.135  Radio is the most frequently con-
sumed form of media in Rwanda and is thus likely to exhibit a substantial effect 
on norms.136  The soap opera delivered messages about reducing prejudice and 
violence against other groups to the experimental group, while a control group 
listened to a radio soap opera with messages about health behaviors.137  The 
experiment found that, compared to the control group who listened to a radio 
soap opera about health behavior, participants who listened to the radio soap 
opera advocating egalitarian and non-violent behaviors reported consonant per-
ceptions of social norms.138  There were also changes in behavior.  Compared 
to listeners of the health soap opera, participants who listened to the reconcili-
ation soap opera offered more dissenting opinions in community discussions, 
engaged in greater negotiation, and made more bids for group cooperation and 
other alternatives when deciding how to share the radio and batteries among 
villagers.139 
 
 129. Bernd Wittenbrink & Julia R. Henley, Creating Social Reality: Informational 
Social Influence and the Content of Stereotypic Beliefs, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 598, 600–02 (1996). 
 130. Id. at 600. 
 131. Id. at 603. 
 132. Id. at 602–03. 
 133. Id. at 604–05. 
 134. See generally Paluck, supra note 13, at 574. 
 135. Id. at 574–75. 
 136. Id. at 576. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 581–82. 
 139. Id. at 582.  In contrast, the health soap opera listeners typically proposed and 
agreed to allowing the village’s local authority to regulate these goods with little dis-
cussion.  Id. 
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There is also substantial indirect evidence of the effect of social norms on 
the perceived acceptability of prejudice.  For example, an experiment that 
asked one group of undergraduate students to rate the normative acceptability 
of negative feelings about 105 different groups (e.g., African-Americans, obese 
people, child abusers) as “definitely OK,” “maybe OK,” or definitely not OK” 
and asked a second group to rate their personal attitudes toward these groups 
found near-perfect correlation between the two groups’ responses.140  In a sub-
sequent experiment, the researchers found high correlation between how par-
ticipants rated the “acceptability of discrimination” averaged across a different 
group of undergraduate study participants and participant reports of the likeli-
hood that they would discriminate against a member of that group when renting 
an apartment, dating, or making an employment decision.141  The researchers 
concluded that “[p]eople will report their own prejudice according to how 
much it is socially acceptable.”142  Low variability in attitudes standing alone 
is insufficient to “prove” a social norm effect.  Yet, no other theory to explain 
these findings has emerged.  This line of research provides additional empirical 
substantiation to the studies discussed previously that directly assessed norma-
tive interventions and found conformity effects. 
Changes in attitudes and behavior following social norm interventions 
appear at least moderately durable.  Emily Zitek and Michelle Hebl’s research 
found persistent effects one month after participants heard a norm-activating 
statement by an experimenter posing as a bystander (a confederate) who con-
doned or condemned prejudice.143  The normative effects were not as strong 
one month later compared to immediately after hearing the statement of the 
confederate, but they were still significant.  Other research has measured the 
effects of norms one week after the experiment and has similarly found dura-
bility.144  Due to the difficulty of long-term follow-up, particularly with under-
graduate students who often participate in experiments, there is no research 
assessing norm-conforming attitudes or behaviors several months or years after 
an experimental intervention. 
A critical question from the perspective of fair housing is whether attitude 
change following communication of a norm translates into behavior.  There is 
significant evidence of behavior change in the studies that have addressed this 
question.  However, more research is needed to understand the contexts likely 
to produce behavior change and its underlying mechanisms.  In Sechrist and 
Stangor’s 2001 study, the experimenters told high-prejudice and low-prejudice 
participants that other university students shared their views about African-
Americans.145  The experimenters then asked the participants to leave the room 
 
 140. Crandall, Social Norms, supra note 13, 362–63. 
 141. Id. at 364. 
 142. Id. at 363. 
 143. Emily M. Zitek & Michelle R. Hebl, The Role of Social Norm Clarity in the 
Influenced Expression of Prejudice Over Time, 43 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
867, 867 (2006). 
 144. See Stangor, Sechrist & Jost, supra note 13, at 486. 
 145. Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 15, at 645. 
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and sit in a nearby seating area while the experimenters fixed a computer mal-
function.146  An African-American student who was recruited by the experi-
menters was stationed in the seat closest to the experimental room that the par-
ticipants exited.147  When high-prejudice participants learned that other univer-
sity students shared the same stereotypes of African-Americans, those partici-
pants sat further away from the African-American student in the hallway in 
comparison to high-prejudice participants told that fellow students did not 
share their views.148  Low-prejudice participants who learned that fellow stu-
dents shared their views also sat closer to the African-American student than 
low-prejudice participants who learned that other students believed negative 
stereotypes.149  Other psychology experiments have found that pre-existing at-
titudes toward people of different races can affect behavior, such as friendliness 
in interpersonal interactions.150 
Interestingly, behavior change can occur even when a norm does not af-
fect a listener’s personal beliefs.  The Paluck field experiment in Rwanda found 
strong evidence of behavior change from the radio soap opera norm-interven-
tion but no effect on personal beliefs.151  Applied to housing, the prevalence of 
non-discriminatory housing advertisements and statements may communicate 
to a listener the normative unacceptability of discrimination in housing trans-
actions while not affecting the listener’s prejudiced private beliefs.  Belief in-
ternalization is desirable because it generalizes to new contexts and likely pro-
motes stronger compliance.  However, behavior change standing alone has sub-
stantial potential to reduce housing discrimination and open real estate markets. 
III. A SOCIAL NORMS MODEL OF HOUSING STATEMENT REGULATION 
The FHA controls communications and, indirectly, the public’s percep-
tion of typical attitudes and conduct toward protected groups in housing trans-
actions.  Eric Posner has described the state’s role in anti-discrimination as that 
 
 146. Id. at 647. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 648. 
 149. Id.  The underlying mechanisms driving the effect on social norms are unclear 
and likely due to multiple variables. 
 150. See John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L. Gaertner, Implicit and 
Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
62, 66 (2002) (finding that self-reported racial attitudes predicted verbal behavior to-
ward African-Americans, while unconscious, automatic prejudice scores affected non-
verbal friendliness and raters’ perceptions of bias in the interaction).  But see Stéphane 
Doyen et al., Behavioral Priming: It’s All in the Mind, But Whose Mind?, PLOS-ONE, 
Jan. 18, 2012, at 1 (replication study failing to find effect of exposure to a stereotype 
on participants’ subsequent behavior). 
 151. Paluck, supra note 13, at 574. 
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of a “norm entrepreneur” that employs not only law but also symbols and sym-
bolic gestures to promote social norms.152  Posner observes that “antidiscrimi-
nation laws raise the cost of sending the signal” that one wishes to cooperate 
with others in a certain group or to discriminate against other groups.153  The 
psychological research on social norms reveals another effect.  Laws control-
ling housing communications shape the attitudes and behavior listeners per-
ceive as expected of them. 
Applying empirical insights from psychology, this Part first examines 
how discriminatory advertisements shape social norms and prejudice.  Next, 
the analysis turns to the dynamics and consequences of discriminatory oral 
speech, which typically reaches smaller audiences.  Then, this Part considers 
research that suggests that the effects of discriminatory statements may differ 
based on the identity of the group that is the subject of the speech.  It concludes 
by describing how a social norms model of § 3604(c) and attention to the prej-
udice-enhancing effects of discriminatory housing speech support the integra-
tion goals at the heart of the FHA’s enactment. 
A. Discriminatory Advertisements 
The psychological research on social norms reveals important justifica-
tions for regulating housing speech – and for doing so strictly and without ex-
ception.  Let us turn first to discriminatory advertisements and notices, which 
by virtue of their wider audience typically have a more powerful effect on so-
cial norms than oral statements.  For landlords and sellers, discriminatory ad-
vertisements and notices communicate prejudiced norms of expression and 
conduct in residential rentals and sales.  The number of discriminatory adver-
tisements influences the normative impact because it conveys information 
about the strength of the majority and hence the norm.154  A high number of 
discriminatory advertisements from speakers perceived as similar to the lis-
tener takes on the status of “consensus information,” which research has shown 
 
 152. Posner, supra note 108, at 778.  He elaborates that, in addition to laws, “offi-
cial pronouncements play an important role[] because official[s] enjoy the attention of 
the nation and thus can cheaply create focal points . . . .  [This] accounts for the heavily 
symbolic content of so much political behavior.”  Id. 
 153. Id. at 787. 
 154. See Clark & Maass, supra note 13, at 99 (discussing norm-induced attitude 
changes moderated by the numerical strength of the majority); Masser & Phillips, supra 
note 13, at 184 (finding that people lower in homophobia expressed less prejudice than 
those higher in homophobia after hearing an alleged majority opinion either in support 
of or opposed to gay rights); Benjamin H. Walker, H. Colleen Sinclair & John MacAr-
thur, Social Norms Versus Social Motives: The Effects of Social Influence and Motiva-
tion to Control Prejudiced Reactions on the Expression of Prejudice, 10 SOC. 
INFLUENCE 55, 64 (2015) (finding people who faced unanimous opposition to their po-
sition on gay rights from four experimenters disguised as participants showed more 
conformity, though not change in personal beliefs, than those faced with non-unani-
mous opposition). 
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affects listeners’ expressed attitudes and sometimes their behaviors.155  How-
ever, even a single statement of prejudice or egalitarianism can shift listeners’ 
attitudes and actions in a corresponding manner, presumably because the state-
ment communicates a norm or activates a pre-existing norm in the listener.  
Importantly, these effects may be on the attitudes that people express to others 
rather than the attitudes themselves.  Recall that some studies have found that 
while communications conveying prejudice changed perceptions of norms and 
in some cases behavior, the communications did not affect participants’ per-
sonal beliefs.156 
In addition to affecting social norms, discriminatory advertisements and 
other statements may cause housing participants to misapprehend their legal 
obligations under the FHA.  Discriminatory advertisements and speech cause 
confusion about the law – an important point in a statute with underfunded en-
forcement.157  As then-judge, now Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote in Spann 
v. Colonial Village, Inc. for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, discriminatory statements can create “a public impression that 
segregation in housing is legal, thus facilitating discrimination by defendants 
or other property owners . . . .”158 
The strength of conformity to social norms increases when the norm em-
anates from a group the listener feels affinity with or finds desirable.159  Much 
of the research discussed in this Article uses protocols that inform people that 
their fellow university students, jurors, or members of other personally relevant 
groups hold a certain view.160  Research has also found that exposing people 
who identify highly with a group to that group’s norms affected intentions to 
engage in behaviors supported by the group.161  The same was not true for low 
identifiers.162  Applied to discriminatory housing publications, it seems likely 
that landlords or sellers will be highly attentive to the actions of their peers.  
This occurs because of their identification as part of a group (e.g., landlords in 
a certain city) as well as because the advertisements suggest norms for residen-
tial transactions.  Interestingly, the data on landlords reveal that their demo-
graphic characteristics are surprisingly cohesive with a broad swathe sharing 
similar investment profiles (number of properties owned) as well as educa-
tional and family backgrounds.163  These similarities may increase landlords’ 
 
 155. See supra Part II; see also Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 15, at 645; Witten-
brink & Henley, supra note 129, at 598–610. 
 156. See supra Part II; see also Paluck, supra note 13, at 582. 
 157. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 158. See 899 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 159. See SHERIF & SHERIF, supra note 116, at 202; Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 
15, at 646. 
 160. See supra Part II. 
 161. See generally Deborah J. Terry & Michael Hogg, Group Norms and the Atti-
tude-Behavior Relationship: A Role for Group Identification, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 776 (1996). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See FOREMOST INSURANCE GROUP, supra note 91, at 5. 
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solidarity as a group and the tendency to conform to the apparent norm of other 
landlords.  Publication of a discriminatory statement may also strengthen its 
normative impact.  Publication suggests that the publisher, or the publication’s 
readership, share the norm or at least do not disagree strongly enough to refuse 
the advertisement. 
By regulating housing advertisements and publications, the FHA artifi-
cially constrains the appearance of discriminatory norms.164  The fact that the 
FHA creates an inaccurate representation of the frequency of prejudice and 
discrimination may not be a weakness but rather a strength of the provision.  
As the experiments discussed in Part II reveal, a listener’s perception of a social 
norm is more important than the actual social norm.165  By the same token, the 
social norms research supports regulating only housing speech that listeners 
will understand as expressing a preference based on group status.166  For ex-
ample, where a landlord merely advertises that an apartment is well-suited to 
one or two professional adults, as occurred in the Bader case discussed previ-
ously,167 it is less likely that such an ambiguous message will negatively affect 
social norms regarding the protected group (or dissuade professional adults 
with children from applying).  Moreover, as discussed previously, enforcement 
in such ambiguous cases may provoke backlash against fair housing efforts.168 
The power of perceived norms is evident in other areas of law as well.  
Writing about tax compliance, Dan Kahan notes that “an individual’s percep-
tion of the extent of evasion powerfully predicts compliance behavior: the 
higher an individual believes the rate of tax cheating to be, the more likely he 
or she is to cheat too.”169  Tax compliance increases following interactions with 
others who express a positive attitude toward tax laws and their intention to 
comply and decreases following interactions with those who express negative 
 
 164. Research indicates that while racial and certain other forms of bias have de-
creased, people retain more subtle preferences not to associate closely with other 
groups.  See, e.g., Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White 
Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 560 
(1980); Adam R. Pearson, John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Nature of Con-
temporary Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism, SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. 
COMPASS 314, 314–35 (2009) (reviewing research literature on subtle biases and rac-
ism). 
 165. See ALAN D. BERKOWITZ, THE SOCIAL NORMS APPROACH: THEORY, 
RESEARCH, AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 5 (2004), http://www.alanberko-
witz.com/articles/social_norms.pdf. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 168. The press account of the fair housing enforcement against Bader suggests a 
degree of public upset and backlash against fair housing over-reach.  See supra notes 
69–72 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and 
Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 81 (2003). 
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attitudes and disclination to comply.170  A study by the Minnesota Department 
of Revenue found that taxpayers who received a letter stating that tax compli-
ance was much higher than what citizens generally estimate subsequently re-
ported more income and fewer deductions than taxpayers who received a letter 
indicating an increased risk of audit.171 
What about buyers, tenants, and borrowers exposed to discriminatory ad-
vertisements?  Exposure to communications indicating prejudice can affect the 
norms of these listeners as well.  There is some research suggesting that in-
creases in prejudice can occur even when the person receiving the prejudiced 
or discriminatory message is a member of the group being discriminated 
against.172  The research on the reactions of members of “stigmatized groups” 
to prejudiced communications is still preliminary, and further investigation is 
needed before we can draw definitive conclusions.173  At a minimum, it is evi-
dent that buyers, tenants, and borrowers from protected groups who read or 
hear about advertisements discriminating against their group will perceive dis-
crimination norms as more prevalent than they would have otherwise.  This is 
likely to affect where they look for housing and the types of landlords or sellers 
they prefer – indeed, this may be the cause of some of the “self-sorting” by race 
observed in the research literature.174 
The normative impact of discriminatory housing speech extends beyond 
members of protected groups to affect others exposed, directly and indirectly, 
to such messages.  The ill effects are worsened by the tendency of stereotypes 
and prejudice to spread across social networks.  Social networks are the con-
stellations of direct and indirect ties that connect people to each other and to 
cultural beliefs and information.175  For example, researchers have found in 
field studies that recent migrants to New York City who met anti-Semitic peo-
ple became more anti-Semitic.176  Another study found that white southern men 
in the 1950s who entered the comparatively more egalitarian environment of 
the army became less prejudiced against African-Americans.177  The transfer-
ence of social norms is also apparent in the startlingly high degree of social 
accord about stereotypes.  Stereotypes are the characteristics people believe to 
be representative of different groups.178  In most cases, people hold stereotypes 
 
 170. See Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act: Do New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?, in WHY PEOPLE 
PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 9 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). 
 171. Id. at 214. 
 172. See generally Crosby et al., supra note 164. 
 173. See Part IV. 
 174. See generally, e.g., Massey, supra note 28. 
 175. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revis-
ited, 1 SOC. THEORY 201, 202 (1983). 
 176. Jeanne Watson, Some Social and Psychological Situations Related to Change 
in Attitude, 3 HUMAN RELATIONS 15, 15, 47 (1950). 
 177. Pettigrew, Regional Differences, supra note 118, at 30. 
 178. Marvin Karlins et al., On the Fading of Social Stereotypes: Studies in Three 
Generations of College Students, 13 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (1969). 
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even though they have had minimal or no contact with the stereotyped group, 
which suggests that those stereotypes are the result of culture and not personal 
experience.179 
In addition to social norms, cognitive dissonance plays a role in the prej-
udice-altering effects of housing speech.  Research on cognitive dissonance 
shows that eliciting an initial cognition or action, even when it is involuntary, 
increases the likelihood that individuals will strive to reduce dissonance by 
making subsequent thoughts, attitudes, or behaviors consonant with the elicited 
position.180  Laws mandating non-discriminatory advertisements and state-
ments make it more likely that speakers will subsequently behave in an egali-
tarian manner. 
B. Oral Statements 
In addition to written advertisements and notices, the FHA also forbids 
discriminatory oral statements.  For example, a landlord cannot lawfully tell a 
family, “I never rent to families with children under the age of five.”  In addi-
tion to blocking or dissuading the home seeker from the transaction at hand, 
discriminatory oral statements can also affect whether the listener subsequently 
explores housing options in the same neighborhoods or with sellers or land-
lords with similar characteristics to the discriminatory speaker.  A home seeker 
may view landlords and sellers in the area as members of the same group and 
assume that bias is shared by the group.  Moreover, as noted previously, per-
ceptions of discrimination tend to spread.  People may discuss a discriminatory 
incident with those in their social network who may in turn share the infor-
mation with others.181 
While discriminatory advertisements that reach wide audiences usually 
have the greatest impact on norms, the psychology research demonstrates that 
a single oral statement can also affect social norms of prejudice.  Investigating 
the effect of racial slurs, Jeff Greenberg and Tom Pyszczynski found that par-
ticipants who received vignettes about either an African-American or a white 
person winning a debate and then overhead a single racial slur subsequently 
rated the skills of the African-American debater who lost more negatively than 
 
 179. See id. 
 180. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1–10 (1957); see 
also Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice, and Violence Against Lesbians and Gay 
Men, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 78 (John C. 
Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991) (“One likely consequence of such behavior 
change [as a result of anti-discrimination statutes] is attitude change: People who are 
required to act in a non-prejudiced manner may subsequently change their attitudes as 
well.”). 
 181. See Section II.A. 
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participants who overhead a neutral remark or nothing.182  There is also evi-
dence that exposure to a prejudiced norm can increase the listener’s prejudice 
against the targeted group even when the listener is part of that group.183  While 
the normative effect of discriminatory oral statements is more incremental than 
publications, the effect of oral statements on norms is nonetheless substantial 
and troubling, as are its direct effects on housing opportunities.184 
For both oral statements and written advertisements, a social norms model 
does not resolve the free speech tensions over § 3604(c) but rather raises new 
questions.  In particular, the research on the effect of hearing discriminatory or 
prejudiced statements on listeners’ willingness to express prejudice – and pos-
sibly on internal beliefs – creates complexity for the view of the First Amend-
ment as protecting a marketplace of ideas and the assumption that contrary 
points of view will be readily forthcoming.185  This is not meant as an argument 
against First Amendment rights, which protect a range of interests in liberty, 
discourse, citizenship, and information, but rather an acknowledgement that 
the psychology research unsettles certain assumptions about the effects of free 
speech.186  Full discussion of the implications of social norms research for the 
First Amendment is an important undertaking, but it is one beyond the scope 
of this Article.  As a doctrinal matter, § 3604(c) does not require us to resolve 
these questions and tensions.  The case law has firmly established that discrim-
inatory housing speech is not protected commercial speech because it relates 
to an illegal activity.187 
 
 182. See Jeff Greenberg & Tom Pyszczynski, The Effect of an Overheard Ethnic 
Slur on Evaluations of the Target: How to Spread a Social Disease, 21 J. OF 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 61, 61–70 (1985). 
 183. Jenessa R. Shapiro & Steven L. Neuberg, When Do the Stigmatized Stigma-
tize? The Ironic Effects of Being Accountable to (Perceived) Majority Group Prejudice-
Expression Norms, 95 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 877, 877 (2008) (conclud-
ing that perception that the majority norm is discriminatory appears to increase discrim-
ination by racial and ethnic minorities). 
 184. In other work, I have discussed the negative effects of discriminatory oral 
statements in producing “stereotype threat,” meaning the tendency of members of ste-
reotyped groups to show impairments in performance after exposure to stereotypes sug-
gesting lower competence in that area by their group.  See Stern & Lewinsohn-Zamir, 
supra note 13. 
 185. The marketplace of ideas for the First Amendment has origins over a century 
old.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market . . . .”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
 186. Another extension of the psychology research is that, from a psychological 
standpoint, more moderate discriminatory speech may be more damaging to norms than 
extreme hate speech, which is likely to be perceived by listeners as an outlier view. 
 187. See supra Section I.B.1. 
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C. Effects on Different Groups Protected Under the Fair Housing Act 
There is some evidence that the kind of norm and its clarity affect the 
magnitude of norm-induced attitude and behavior change from discriminatory 
statements.  A study by Margo Monteith and co-researchers found that partic-
ipants conformed to the normative stance of an experimenter posing as a by-
stander when that person expressed egalitarian opinions about African-Ameri-
cans and gays but not prejudiced ones.188  Monteith concluded that this finding 
is due to the strong social norm, evidenced in much survey research, against 
expressing bias toward African-Americans and gay people.189 
It is not certain how this finding translates to the context of fair housing.  
Contrary to the conclusion of Monteith and her co-researchers, discriminatory 
housing speech may have a greater prejudice-enhancing effect if listeners view 
housing discrimination as a more socially acceptable form of prejudice.190  
Also the research findings are mixed, with some research finding that exposure 
to prejudiced norms shifts listeners’ attitudes in a consonant direction but less 
robustly than exposure to tolerant norms.  The study by Zitek and Hebl dis-
cussed previously found that people were more strongly influenced by com-
munications about ambiguous norms than well-established norms.191  In their 
study, participants responded to a survey about discrimination against one of 
five different groups after hearing the responses of another participant who was 
actually a confederate planted by the experimenters.192  The confederate’s nor-
mative influence was much stronger when the survey addressed ambiguous, 
low clarity norms, such as discrimination against ex-convicts, than when the 
survey asked identical questions about African-American, gay, and obese indi-
viduals – groups associated with stronger anti-discrimination norms.193 
If conformity increases when norms are less crystalline, regulating dis-
criminatory housing statements may have the strongest impact when strong 
anti-discrimination norms do not attach to particular protected group.  Families 
with children offer a paradigm example; people with disabilities likely do as 
well.  Discrimination against these groups is more common and tolerated in 
our society.  In contrast, abundant survey and experimental research, including 
a measure developed by Zitek and Hebl, find robust social norms against dis-
criminating against minority racial groups and to a somewhat lesser degree gay 
 
 188. Monteith, Deneen & Tooman, supra note 13, at 267.  She interpreted this find-
ing to indicate that “hearing nonprejudiced expressions served to activate a powerful 
social norm suggesting that one should not be prejudiced [and] . . . the social norm 
favoring prejudice is not, at present, as strong as the norm opposing prejudice.”  Id. at 
283; see also Walker, Sinclair & MacArthur, supra note 154, at 65–66 (finding that 
pro-gay rights norms induced more attitude and behavior change than anti-gay rights 
norms). 
 189. Monteith, Deneen & Tooman, supra note 13, at 267. 
 190. See Blanchard et al., supra note 13, at 993–94. 
 191. See Zitek & Hebl, supra note 143, at 867–70. 
 192. Id. at 870. 
 193. Id. 
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individuals.194  This does not mean that people lack prejudice toward these 
groups but rather that there is social pressure not to express it overtly.195  Alt-
hough the research is too limited to be certain, it seems likely that prohibiting 
discriminatory housing statements regarding low clarity norms (e.g., discrimi-
nating against families) will have particularly strong, and needed, prejudice-
reducing effects. 
D. Social Norms and the Fair Housing Act’s Goal of Integration 
Social norms affect whether landlords, sellers, and others eschew discrim-
inatory conduct, the willingness to transact between different groups, and the 
extent to which house hunters view neighborhoods as tolerant.  All of these 
effects promote integration – a goal that was at the heart of the work of the 
Kerner Commission in advocating legislation and the FHA’s passage.196  In 
view of the FHA’s major goal of integration, it seems likely that the enactors 
had something akin to social norms in mind when they crafted § 3604(c).197  At 
the time, discriminatory housing advertisements and notices against blacks 
were ubiquitous and segregation was a pressing issue as alarm over black ghet-
toes burgeoned.198  It would not require a mental leap for legislators to realize 
that the frequency of discriminatory housing speech bolstered its social accept-
ability and thwarted residential integration by discouraging applicants from tar-
geted groups from seeking housing in certain areas. 
The legislative history does not illuminate the degree to which the House 
and Senate apprehended the normative force of § 3604(c) at the time it was 
enacted.199  In fact, the legislative history does not explain the impetus for            
§ 3604(c) at all except to record that Congress felt that Title VII should be the 
starting place for crafting the FHA.200  However, as noted above, given the 
social context and prevalence of housing discrimination at the time of the 
FHA’s passage, it seems likely that its supporters intuited that discriminatory 
statements and advertisements would undermine the goal of integration by cul-
tivating the impression of widespread prejudice.  In a similar vein, the United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the FHA’s critical mission of 
 
 194. Id. at 870; see also Monteith, Deneen & Tooman, supra note 13, at 267. 
 195. See Christian S. Crandall, Prejudice Against Fat People: Ideology and Self-
Interest, 66(5) J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 882, 889-90 (1994) (describing 
how social norms and egalitarian values suppress overt racism while weaker social 
norms against anti-fat prejudice offer less constraint on the expression of anti-fat sen-
timents) [hereinafter Crandall, Anti-Fat Prejudice]; Crandall, Social Norms, supra note 
13, at 362–64. 
 196. Crandall, Social Norms, supra note 13, at 362–64. 
 197. See 114 Cong. Rec. 2276, 3422, 9559, & 9591 (1968); see also supra Part I. 
 198. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 212–13. 
 199. Id. at 199, 204–11. 
 200. See id. at 207–08. 
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promoting residential integration in interpreting § 3604(c) and other FHA pro-
visions.201 
IV. REVISITING SOME PUZZLES OF SECTION 3604(C) 
Section 3604(c) of the FHA embodies both paradoxes and controversies.  
A social norms model of housing speech regulation illuminates some of these 
puzzles and offers compelling justifications for seemingly anomalous aspects 
of § 3604(c).  This Part considers how social norms support § 3604(c)’s lack 
of an intent requirement, the inapplicability of exemptions that shield defend-
ants from other provisions of the FHA, and standing rules for discriminatory 
housing speech claims. 
A. Intent 
Section 3604(c) is unusual within anti-discrimination law because it im-
poses liability without a requirement that the plaintiff establish the defendant’s 
intent.202  The statutory language requires only that the housing statement, no-
tice, or advertisement “indicates” discrimination or preference based on a pro-
tected status.203  Other provisions of the FHA require that discriminatory re-
fusal to rent or sell or discrimination in the terms and conditions of a housing 
transaction occurred “because of” the protected status.204  Courts have consist-
ently interpreted this language to mean that an “ordinary listener or reader” test 
applies to determine whether housing speech violates the FHA.205  In difficult 
cases, where the language used in the statement is ambiguous and the ordinary 
listener standard hard to apply, courts have considered evidence of intent to 
adjudicate § 3604(c) claims.206  As the court in Soules v. HUD explained, courts 
may look to intent in § 3604(c) claims “not because a lack of design constitutes 
an affirmative defense to an FHA violation [] but because it helps determine 
the manner in which a statement was made and the way an ordinary [reader] 
would have interpreted it.”207 
 
 201. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (suggesting 
the importance of integration by upholding standing for white residents of an apartment 
complex to sue for their landlord’s racial discrimination against African-American ap-
plicants based on their injuries from segregation); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
 202. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2018). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.§ 3604(a); id. § 3604(b); id.§ 3604(d); id. § 3605(a). 
 205. See, e.g., Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995); Soules v. HUD, 
967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir.  
1991); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 206. See, e.g., Soules, 967 F.2d at 825; Mancuso v. Douglas Elliman, LLC, 808 F. 
Supp. 2d 606, 625–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Maziarz v. Hous. Auth. of the Town of Vernon, 
281 F.R.D. 71, 78 (D. Conn. 2012). 
 207. 967 F.2d at 825. 
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While an ordinary listener standard is unusual from the perspective of 
discrimination law, it is unsurprising from the vantage point of social norms.  
A standard that focuses on the ordinary reader or listener rather than the 
speaker’s intent better captures the injury to norms.  If an average individual 
who reads an advertisement or hears a housing statement finds that the housing 
speech indicates a preference based on membership in a protected group, then 
that statement is likely to affect social norms.  The standard of the speaker’s 
intent, on the other hand, does not closely track normative effects on listeners.  
At times, the case law seems to allude to norms when it elaborates on the ordi-
nary listener/reader standard.  In Ragin v. New York Times Co., the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified that the ordinary reader “is neither 
the most suspicious nor the most insensitive of our citizenry.”208  Viewed from 
a normative perspective, this holding eschews a focus on outliers and instead 
captures statements that activate more widespread norms. 
The ordinary listener or reader standard expands § 3604(c)’s function 
from remedying individual psychic injury to also addressing normative harms.  
Accordingly, most cases refer to a generic ordinary reader or listener.  How-
ever, the Second Circuit has stated that the statutory test is whether an adver-
tisement “would discourage an ordinary reader of a particular [protected group] 
from answering it.”209  A social norms perspective favors the former approach 
of an unspecified ordinary reader or listener rather than an ordinary reader or 
listener from a specific protected group.  As the social norms research makes 
clear, the impact of discriminatory advertisements on ordinary readers and lis-
teners from non-protected groups is substantial. 
It may seem unfair to impose liability on defendants for statements they 
did not intend as discriminatory.  Multiple factors counteract this concern.  
First, unintentional discrimination is particularly likely to involve ambiguous 
and opaque statements (in contrast, one who writes “no blacks” in their housing 
advertisement can hardly claim lack of intent to discriminate).  Given the lim-
ited resources for FHA enforcement, unequivocal discriminatory housing 
speech is more likely to be subject to a complaint or prosecution than ambigu-
ous, possibly unintentional claims.  Second, in complaints and actions by HUD, 
the government must seek “conciliation . . . to the extent feasible.”210  Although 
settlement negotiations are not required for suits brought by private parties, 
voluntary settlement often has attractions for both sides (particularly for de-
fendants who do not have insurance policies to indemnify their legal expenses).  
Third, we must weigh potential unfairness to defendants under the current, 
strict liability approach against the consequences of an intent-based standard.  
Exempting unintentional statements, or those in a gray area of partial or con-
fused intent, would stymie litigation with difficult-to-resolve questions of in-
tent and create incentives for landlords and sellers to use thinly veiled state-
ments and then claim lack of intent.  It would make it exceedingly hard for 
 
 208. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1002. 
 209. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999–1000. 
 210. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b)(1) (2018); 24 C.F.R. § 103.300(a) (2012). 
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plaintiffs to prevail on § 3604(c) claims.  These results would undermine              
§ 3604(c)’s capacity to promote open residential markets and cultivate non-
discriminatory norms. 
B. Exemptions: The Psychology of a Single Statement 
A puzzle of the FHA is the fact that numerous exemptions to liability 
apply to discriminatory acts but not to discriminatory statements or publica-
tions.  As discussed in Part I, § 3604(c) is not subject to the exemptions for 
Mrs. Murphys who own and occupy housing of four units or less; sellers or 
landlords who do not own more than three single-family homes and do not use 
a real estate broker or agent; and private clubs and religious organizations.211  
It is not immediately evident why these owners should be able to lawfully dis-
criminate but not lawfully advertise their intentions.  Some aspects of the ex-
emptions, such as the inapplicability of some provisions of the FHA to owners 
of single-family homes who do not use a real estate agent, suggest a concern 
in part with the burden on owners who lack legal expertise to comply with the 
FHA.212  Presumably, however, these owners are similarly challenged to ascer-
tain and understand § 3604(c)’s prohibition of discriminatory statements and 
publications. 
A social norms model of § 3604(c) offers a fresh perspective on the ques-
tion of exemptions.  The broad applicability of housing statement regulation is 
necessary to prevent norm dilution.  Norms represent a consensus – or, more 
accurately, a perceived consensus – within a group.  Even a small number of 
dissonant statements can muddy the norm, rendering it ineffective.  Psychology 
studies have found that one instance of a person expressing a racist, or anti-
racist, view can affect or activate social norms.  For example, in a 1994 study 
by Fletcher Blanchard, Christian Crandall, John Brigham, and Leigh Ann 
Vaughn, participants who heard the ratings of an experimenter posing as a sur-
vey participant (a confederate) on how the campus should respond to racial 
harassment altered their responses in line with those of the confederate.213  This 
effect occurred with both African-American and white confederates; it also oc-
curred when participants responded to the survey privately as well as pub-
licly.214  A subsequent study by Margo Monteith, Nicole Deneen, and Gregory 
Tooman using a similar experimental design replicated the normative effect of 
hearing a single confederate condemn discrimination on participants’ re-
sponses to survey scenarios depicting discrimination against African-Ameri-
cans and gay men.215  Even mere overhearing can affect perceptions.  A study 
 
 211. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1); id. § 3603(b)(2); id. § 3607(a). 
 212. See id. § 3603(b)(1). 
 213. See Blanchard et al., supra note 13, at 995–96. 
 214. See id. at 995.  Following the statement of the confederate condemning racism, 
participants who responded publicly condemned racism more strongly than private re-
sponders.  See id. 
 215. Monteith, Deneen & Tooman, supra note 13, at 267. 
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by Eaaron Henderson-King and Richard Nisbett found that white participants 
who overheard a nearby confederate talking on a phone about a recent violent 
robbery committed by an African-American were more likely to rate African-
Americans as hostile and antagonistic.216 
The research showing that a single statement can alter prejudiced re-
sponses and behaviors underscores the importance of comprehensive regula-
tion of housing speech.  Discriminatory refusals to sell or rent and other actions 
prohibited under the FHA can increase prejudiced norms as well.  Although 
the courts have interpreted exemptions restrictively in practice, it remains true 
that a number of claims cannot proceed or are never brought because the de-
fendant falls within an exempted category.217  Were these exemptions to apply 
to § 3604(c), it is likely that there would be a high number of discriminatory 
statements in printed notices and advertisements and some increase in discrim-
inatory oral statements as well.  If a single statement can shape prejudice and 
discrimination, the prospect of many advertisements indicating that others dis-
criminate is sobering.  Indeed, this concerning situation is occurring with in-
ternet housing advertisements, which have been partially shielded from fair 
housing liability under the more recently-enacted CDA.  As a result, online 
advertisements feature discriminatory statements far more often than print me-
dia.218 
C. Standing 
Social norms also lend support to the expansive standing to bring suit for 
violation of § 3604(c) and other provisions of the FHA.  The FHA empowers 
an “aggrieved person” to bring suit privately or file an administrative complaint 
with HUD.219  In a § 3604(c) suit, a member of a protected group can sue for 
emotional and psychological damages caused by a discriminatory housing 
statement (though not for the loss of the housing unit itself).220  In addition, a 
wide range of other plaintiffs can bring suit.  The United States Supreme Court 
has defined standing broadly, holding that the FHA’s private enforcement and 
administrative investigation provisions reveal Congress’ intention “to define 
standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.”221 
Prudential limitations, such as requirements that a party raise his or her 
own grievance and not the grievances of others and the rule barring suits alleg-
ing generalized grievances, are also relaxed in FHA claims.222  In Gladstone 
 
 216. See Eaaron I. Henderson-King & Richard E. Nisbett, Anti-Black Prejudice as 
a Function of Exposure to the Negative Behavior of a Single Black Person, 71 J. OF 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 654, 661–62 (1996). 
 217. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 196 n.31. 
 218. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1153–80; see also infra Section VI.A. 
 219. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2018); id. § 3613 (a)(1)(A). 
 220. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 241. 
 221. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). 
 222. See e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982). 
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Realtors v. City of Bellwood, the United States Supreme Court held that any 
person or entity can bring suit for housing discrimination that violates some-
one’s rights so long as the person suing has been “genuinely injured.”223  Res-
idents and localities have sued for injury from segregation, and fair housing 
organizations have sued for housing statements and other discrimination 
against “testers” who pose as home seekers.224  These decisions have greatly 
aided enforcement of the FHA by empowering fair housing advocacy organi-
zations and a wide range of other private parties to bring suit.225 
This does not mean standing is without bounds.  While standing doctrine 
in FHA suits remains generous on the whole, there are hints of increasing re-
strictiveness.  The recent United States Supreme Court case of Bank of America 
Corp. v. City of Miami held that while the City was an “aggrieved person” 
under the FHA for its claims that Bank of America had engaged in racially 
discriminatory lending, the City failed to show the proximate cause required 
by the FHA to recover damages.226  The Court held that the plaintiff must do 
more than show that its alleged injury foreseeably flowed from the defendant’s 
conduct and instead show a direct relation between the injury asserted and the 
alleged discriminatory housing practices.227  In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit declined to extend standing to a resident suing the county 
recorder for violating the FHA and civil rights statutes by maintaining real es-
tate records containing racially restrictive covenants.228  The court held that the 
plaintiff had not suffered an actual or threatened injury because he did not al-
lege an intent to buy or rent property and, even if he had, the restrictive cove-
nants were no longer valid or enforceable.229  Merely alleging that the racially 
restrictive covenants discouraged him from purchasing real estate and created 
a feeling that he and others were not welcome was not sufficient to confer 
standing.230 
To be clear, this Article does not assert that social norms should dictate 
standing doctrine as a general matter – such a move runs the risk of collapsing 
standing as a doctrine of restriction.  Instead, it considers the narrower point of 
the inter-relationship between standing under the FHA and a conception of in-
jury to social norms.  In the case of the FHA, the jurisprudence already extends 
capacious, although not unlimited, standing.  A social norms model of                  
§ 3604(c) does not change this result.  Rather it offers a new way of under-
standing expansive standing decisions and additional support for extending 
standing in disputed cases.  In addition to psychic injury to members of pro-
 
 223. 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979). 
 224. See id. at 94. 
 225. See Schwemm, supra note 99, at 382–83. 
 226. 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017). 
 227. See id. at 1311. 
 228. Mason v. Adams Cty. Recorder, 901 F.3d 753 (2018). 
 229. Id. at 755–57. 
 230. Id. 
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tected groups or harms to integration from truncated housing searches, discrim-
inatory housing statements cause harms to listeners’ social norms.  These 
norms in turn are likely to negatively affect attitudes and behaviors and impede 
the goal of integration. 
V. THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL NORMS 
Richard McAdams, the leading legal scholar of social norms, has wisely 
observed that social norms have both potential and limitations for law.231  Sim-
ilarly, the power of social norms in housing speech regulation is subject to con-
straints as well as concerns about unintended consequences.  This Part of the 
Article discusses these limitations and briefly considers some of the alterna-
tives to norm-based intervention. 
First, prohibiting discriminatory housing statements in furtherance of 
egalitarian norms may have unintended consequences.  For example, in the 
employment context, a recent study found that state legislation prohibiting em-
ployers from inquiring about criminal history substantially decreased the num-
ber of young, uneducated African-American and Latino men interviewed and 
hired.232  More research is needed to ascertain how home seekers react when 
the discriminatory preferences of other parties to the transaction are revealed 
versus hidden.  Absent statements revealing a seller’s or landlord’s preferences, 
it is possible that home seekers will focus their search in localities and neigh-
borhoods where their group predominates in an effort to avoid unpleasant re-
jections.   
Faced with prohibitions on discriminatory housing speech, landlords, 
sellers, and lenders may shift to more covert forms of expressing discrimina-
tory preferences.  As discussed previously, following the enactment of                  
§ 3604(c), developers and landlords tried to use only white models in order to 
signal preferences; case law now restricts such conduct.233  There have been 
contentions in the legal scholarship that developers use certain amenities, such 
as golf courses, to discourage African-Americans.234  Despite these possibili-
ties for evasion, § 3604(c) still conveys benefits by raising the cost of com-
municating discriminatory housing preferences.235  Covert signals, such as res-
idential amenities, are a costlier and less reliable way of effecting discrimina-
tion than bald statements that certain groups are not welcome. 
 
 231. See RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND 
LIMITS 1–15 (2015); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1543–45 (2000). 
 232. See Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, The Unintended Consequences of 
“Ban the Box”: Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal 
Histories Are Hidden 16–20 (Oct. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://jennifer-
doleac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Doleac_Hansen_BanTheBox.pdf. 
 233. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Strahilevitz, supra note 107, at 450–79; see also supra Section I.B. 
 235. Even if the FHA did not regulate housing speech at all, property owners might 
still use amenities and other, more covert signals to communicate preferences.  Outright 
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Second, perhaps it is paternalistic for the government to attempt to change 
people’s attitudes and preferences by artificially constraining housing 
speech.236  This concern is endemic to a wide range of psychological interven-
tions and behavioral “nudges.”237  In the case of social norms, it is not so evi-
dent that § 3604(c) has altered underlying preferences.  Recall that some ex-
periments have found that perceptions of norms changed following egalitarian 
communications but not personal beliefs.238  Virtually all of the psychology 
experiments use self-report measures that the participants know will be read by 
the experimenters.  Participants may not be confident that their responses will 
remain anonymous.  As Crandall observes, “[W]hen using self-report tech-
niques to measure racial attitudes, social norms about public behavior, egali-
tarian values, and social desirability concerns all contaminate the process.”239  
Thus, a normative theory of housing speech regulation may not implicate the 
classic concern of government manipulating beliefs and preferences.  How-
ever, regulation of housing speech does influence norms and, in some in-
stances, behaviors.  This is also true of a decision by the government not to 
regulate housing speech.  The omission of housing speech regulation also af-
fects norms and behaviors with respect to prejudice and housing discrimina-
tion.  It is unclear why the former should be considered paternalistic while the 
latter is deemed liberty-regarding. 
Third, one might reasonably ask, if communicating non-discriminatory 
social norms for housing transactions is effective, then why does prejudice and 
residential segregation remain a challenge?240  The contention in this Article is 
not that social norms eliminate housing discrimination but that they reduce it.  
 
expressions of prejudice are normatively objectionable to most Americans even in the 
absence of laws forbidding such statements.  See e.g., Charles E. Case & Andrew M. 
Greeley, Attitudes Toward Racial Equality, 16 HUMBOLDT J. OF SOC. RELATIONS 67, 
67 (1990); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Prejudice, Discrimination, and Rac-
ism: Historical Trends and Contemporary Approaches, in PREJUDICE, 
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 1, 1–10 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 
1986). 
 236. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1171 (“At the level of the individual, it is fairly 
paternalistic to use the law as a tool to encourage a person to change his preferences by 
preventing him from articulating them . . . .”). 
 237. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Eco-
nomics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
1033, 1059–60 (2012); Robert Sugden, On Nudging: A Review of Nudge: Improving 
Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sun-
stein, 16 INT. J. OF THE ECON. OF BUS. 365, 367, 370 (2009); see also Gary M. Lucas, 
Jr., Paternalism and Psychic Taxes: The Government’s Use of Negative Emotions to 
Save Us from Ourselves, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 227, 257–62 (2013). 
 238. See, e.g., Paluck, supra note 13, at 582. 
 239. See Crandall, Anti-Fat Prejudice, supra note 195, at 889. 
 240. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 28, at 581–82.  Massey recently concluded, “De-
spite some signs of progress toward a more integrated society, the pace of desegregation 
has been quite uneven and 46 years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act many 
areas remain just as [racially] segregated as they were in 1968.”  Id. 
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There is evidence that residential segregation has decreased significantly since 
the passage of the FHA.241  There is also evidence that racial and ethnic preju-
dice has declined on surveys, with overwhelming majorities rejecting prejudice 
and discrimination against African-Americans and other racial minorities.242  
“Subtle racism” or unconscious bias in interpersonal interactions, employment, 
and other settings has substantially displaced overt bias and hostility.243  One 
theory offered to explain these results is that people repress racism in accord-
ance with social norms sanctioning it.244  Although this falls short of true egal-
itarianism, a change in the norms of expressing prejudice is nonetheless bene-
ficial for reducing discrimination in housing transactions.  While it is impossi-
ble to attribute reductions in overt prejudice to any one provision or law, at a 
minimum these findings are consistent with a theory of normative gains from 
housing speech and other civil rights regulation. 
Fourth, another possible objection is that the altering social norms may 
not redress important forms of direct housing discrimination.  For example, 
while prohibiting discriminatory housing statements promotes non-discrimina-
tory social norms, it does nothing for the individual who answers a facially 
non-discriminatory advertisement only to find that a small-scale landlord may 
lawfully discriminate against him.245  The contention of this Article is not that 
social norms can solve all manner of fair housing law ills, replace the FHA’s 
 
 241. Edward Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century: Ra-
cial Separation in America’s Neighborhoods, 1890-2010, MANHATTAN INS. FOR POL’Y 
RES. (Jan. 22, 2012), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/end-segregated-cen-
tury-racial-separation-americas-neighborhoods-1890-2010-5848.html.  While racial 
segregation does appear to have decreased, the magnitude of the effect depends on how 
researchers define segregation.  See Ray Sin & Maria Krysan, What Is Racial Residen-
tial Integration? A Research Synthesis, 1950–2013, 14 SOC. OF RACE & ETHNICITY 467, 
472–73 (2015) (suggesting Glaeser and Vigdor’s strong finding of integration was par-
tially due to defining integration as black-nonblack rather than black-white residential 
proximity). 
 242. See e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 235, at 1–10; Case & Greeley, supra 
note 235, at 67. 
 243. Crosby et al., supra note 164, at 546; see also Pearson, Dovidio & Gaertner, 
supra note 164, at 314–35 (reviewing research literature on subtle biases and racism). 
 244. Crosby et al., supra note 164, at 559; see also Crandall, Anti-Fat Prejudice, 
supra note 195, at 889 (concluding that “whether positive or negative behaviors [toward 
African-Americans] are carried out usually depends on the social norms about the ex-
pression of racism.”).  As psychologist Crandall and his co-researchers observe, “Alt-
hough it may be encouraging that survey reports of prejudice are on the decline, these 
reports may reflect conformity to social rules regarding appropriate behavior rather than 
personal values and beliefs.”  Crandall, Social Norms, supra note 13, at 360. 
 245. A number of scholars have criticized the Mrs. Murphy exemption legalizing 
discrimination and maintaining segregation.  See, e.g., Marie Failinger, Remembering 
Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and 
Religious Landlords, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 383–85 (2001); James D. Walsh, Reach-
ing Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing 
Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 605, 605–10 (1999). 
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prohibitions on discriminatory refusal to rent, sell, or lend, or justify exemp-
tions from the FHA.  Rather, it is that social norms are a powerful complement 
to other rules and policies. 
Last, unanswered questions and data gaps are a limitation of a social 
norms theory of housing speech regulation.  In particular, it would be helpful 
to have research on communications and social norms specific to housing and 
various types of real estate transactions (e.g., roommate, small-scale landlord, 
sales, lending).  To date, the bulk of the research on social norms has assessed 
other contexts, such as jury trials, employment, and dating, but not housing.246  
There are also substantial gaps in understanding the psychological processes 
that mediate the response to social norms.247  For example, we do not know 
whether persuasion techniques deplete resources for self-regulation (i.e., alter-
ing behavior in the face of preferred, automatic, or low-cost alternatives).  De-
pleting cognitive resources may make people more likely to conform to certain 
norms, particularly those that convey information about the frequency or like-
lihood of a behavior.248  This is highly relevant to the context of housing trans-
actions, which, like any commercial transaction, typically entail attempts at 
persuasion and manipulation (e.g., framing information, manipulating order of 
presentation, and obscuring negative pricing information).249  Additionally, 
there are data gaps on individual variability in response to social norms and the 
reactions of different groups to normative information.250  For example, there 
is limited research addressing the effect of communications and consensus in-
formation on the attitudes of racial minorities and members of other “stigma-
tized groups.”251 
Despite these limitations, social norms play an important role in redress-
ing housing discrimination and promoting integration.  The benefits of shifting 
social norms via housing speech come into sharper focus when one compares 
 
 246. See, e.g., Wittenbrink & Henley, supra note 129, at 598; Crandall, Social 
Norms, supra note 13, at 364. 
 247. See, e.g., Ryan P. Jacobson, Chad R. Mortensen & Robert B. Cialdini, Bodies 
Obliged and Unbound: Differentiated Response Tendencies for Injunctive and Descrip-
tive Social Norms, 100 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 433, 433 (2010). 
 248. See id. at 434–35, 442–46 (finding that the hypothesized increase in conform-
ity to descriptive norms in the depletion condition was present but was not statistically 
significant).  Other research has shown that people have a reduced capacity to regulate 
themselves following exposure to persuasion techniques such as the foot-in-the-door 
technique and greater vulnerability to subsequent persuasion techniques.  See Bob M. 
Fennis, Loes Janssen & Kathleen D. Vohs, Acts of Benevolence: A Limited-Resource 
Account of Compliance with Charitable Requests, 35 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 906, 906–
10 (2009). 
 249. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The 
Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 758 (2006). 
 250. But see Walker, Sinclair & MacArthur, supra note 154, at 64–66. 
 251. But see Shapiro & Neuberg, supra note 183, at 877 (concluding that perception 
that the majority norm is discriminatory appears to increase discrimination by racial 
and ethnic minorities). 
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the alternatives.  Rules that prohibit acts of discrimination have high enforce-
ment costs due to the decentralized nature of housing.252  In comparison, at 
least some § 3604(c) cases can be brought by fair housing organizations perus-
ing advertisements.253  Because fair housing organizations, as well as publish-
ers who are liable for violations, review print housing advertisements, report-
ing by an individual victim is often not necessary to prevent or redress discrim-
inatory housing speech.  In contrast, substantive discrimination, such as expe-
riencing a refusal to rent based on ethnicity, often requires that the victims of 
the discrimination report what is typically an unpleasant and humiliating expe-
rience.  Research in both psychology and law shows that victims of acts of 
discrimination under-report.254  This likely occurs in part because people who 
report discrimination are rated negatively by others.  Empirical work finds that 
people view those who complain about discrimination as sensitive, irritating, 
and troublemakers.255  Not surprisingly, individuals who pursue anti-discrimi-
nation suits have a much lower likelihood of succeeding in court than other 
types of litigants.256  In response to these obstacles, fair housing organizations 
have hired “testers” who pose as housing applicants and report violations.257  
Yet, use of testers is resource-intensive and can only reach a tiny fraction of 
housing discrimination.258 
Social norm interventions have been successful at reducing prejudice, or 
at least its expression, compared to other psychological strategies.  In general, 
strategies to combat bias and discrimination have proven difficult to engineer. 
For example, a recent study by Calvin Lai and co-researchers tested seventeen 
interventions and found that none durably reduced bias.259  As discussed in Part 
 
 252. James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second 
Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1100 (1989). 
 253. Crossett, supra note 24, at 211; Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1174. 
 254. See, e.g., HUD, DO WE KNOW MORE NOW? TRENDS IN PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, 
SUPPORT, AND USE OF FAIR HOUSING LAW iii (2006), https://www.huduser.gov/por-
tal/publications/hsgfin/FairHsngSurvey.html. 
 255. See Cheryl. R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the Victim: The Interper-
sonal Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & 
INTERGROUP GROUP PROCESSES & RELS. 227, 229 (2003); Cheryl. R. Kaiser & Carol 
T. Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimina-
tion, PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 254 (2001). 
 256. See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits 
of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1333, 1342–45 (2012) (arguing 
that claims that do not directly evoke discrimination, like just cause or infliction of 
emotional stress, may be more effective routes to plaintiffs due to the prejudice against 
them). 
 257. See Freiberg, supra note 46, at 240–48. 
 258. Id. at 247. 
 259. In this “intervention contest,” none of the interventions reduced explicit bias, 
and only half had any effect on reducing automatic, unconscious bias measured by the 
IAT.  See Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: I. A Comparative 
Investigation of 17 Interventions, 143 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 1765, 1765 
(2014).  When the researchers re-measured several days later, even those modest effects 
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II, there is evidence that social norms can reduce the expression of prejudice 
and can do so in situations where other strategies have proven difficult to im-
plement successfully. 
For example, historically both law and psychology have envisioned con-
tact between members of different groups as the remedy for prejudice and dis-
crimination.260  Yet, direct intergroup contact has limitations to its ability to 
reduce prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.261  Contact with people 
from other groups tends to reduce prejudice, but it does not invariably do so.262  
The magnitude of prejudice reduction from inter-group contact is higher when 
the contact is voluntary and under conditions of equal status.263  If these con-
ditions are difficult for psychologists to engineer in the lab, then it is that much 
more difficult for housing agencies and programs that operate in private, capi-
talist housing markets.  Accordingly, it is possible that laws that change the 
perceived frequency of housing discrimination and prejudice may have an 
equal, or greater, effect on opening housing markets than direct initiatives to 
integrate neighborhoods. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT DEBATES IN FAIR HOUSING 
The research on social norms offers a different perspective on controver-
sies within fair housing law.  The effect of communications on social norms 
clarifies the multi-faceted nature of the harm from discriminatory housing 
statements.  Discriminatory housing statements not only injure members of 
protected groups who hear them but also shape listeners’ and others’ prejudices 
and their propensity to engage in discriminatory conduct.  This shift in concep-
tualizing the nature of the harm from discriminatory statements is relevant to a 
number of current debates.  To illustrate, this Part of the Article briefly consid-
ers how social norms research informs (1) the conflict between the FHA and 
the CDA and (2) debates over whether § 3604(c) should be applied to room-
mate advertisements. 
 
had disappeared.  Id. at 1782.  The IAT measures how closely a participant associates 
different concepts by measuring how quickly he or she categorizes two target concepts 
(e.g., black, white) with an attribute (e.g., good, bad).  Id. at 1782. 
 260. See supra notes 119–28. 
 261. See Stangor, Sechrist & Jost, supra note 13, at 486–87 (“Studying alternative 
approaches to stereotype change is important because there are theoretical and practical 
limitations to the assumption that stereotypes are changed primarily as a result of direct 
intergroup contact.”). 
 262. See ALLPORT, supra note 127, at 1–10.  Pettigrew and Tropp conducted a meta-
analysis of studies on intergroup contact and found that contact decreased prejudice and 
that Allport’s “optimal conditions” (e.g., voluntary contact, equal status) increased the 
magnitude of this effect.  Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test 
of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 751 
(2006). 
 263. See Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 262, at 766. 
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A. Communications Decency Act 
Section 230 of the CDA protects online service providers from liability 
for user-generated content posted on their sites.264  The CDA provides that 
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information con-
tent provider.”265  The CDA exempts federal criminal laws, intellectual prop-
erty laws, and some privacy laws from this provision but does not exempt or 
even mention the FHA.266  There is no indication that the enactors of the CDA 
perceived the conflict with the FHA or considered its ramifications. 
As a result, courts have been left to interpret FHA claims in light of the 
CDA.  In a key case, Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights v. 
Craigslist, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the plain 
language of the CDA established that Craigslist was not a publisher but a con-
duit for third party content.267  The website was merely posting content rather 
than altering or creating it.268  Thus, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights 
had no claim against Craigslist but could bring suit against individuals who 
posted discriminatory housing advertisements on the Craigslist website.269  But 
in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, Roommates.com created a 
search function that prompted posters to list discriminatory preferences and 
allowed them to filter potential roommates by various characteristics, some of 
which are protected under the FHA.270  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that the website became a publisher by virtue of helping to create 
the discriminatory content and thus faced liability under the FHA.271  Given 
the divergence in the case law, there is the possibility that a deepening circuit 
split could garner United States Supreme Court review.272 
Notably, the CDA does not shield individuals who post discriminatory 
advertisements on websites.273  However, identifying individual posters is la-
borious and sometimes impossible.274  In many cases, websites do not collect 
identifying information and some even promote anonymity by creating tempo-
rary, anonymous email addresses for each post.275  The CDA removes from fair 
 
 264. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
 265. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 266. Id. § 230(e). 
 267. 519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 672. 
 270. See 521 F.3d 1157, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 271. Id. at 1166–68. 
 272. See Diane J. Klein & Charles Doskow, Housingdiscrimination.com?: The 
Ninth Circuit (Mostly) Puts Out the Welcome Mat for Fair Housing Act Suits Against 
Roommate-Matching Websites, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 329, 376–78 (2008). 
 273. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1174. 
 274. Id. at 1174–75. 
 275. Id. at 1173; see also Stephen Collins, Comment, Saving Fair Housing on the 
Internet: The Case for Amending the Communications Decency Act, 102 N.W.U. L. 
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housing enforcement the far more efficient alternative of imposing liability on 
internet service providers.  Internet service providers who are liable have a 
strong incentive to develop policies and systems to restrict discriminatory ad-
vertisements. 
The lack of liability for online service providers has opened a significant 
chasm in FHA enforcement, particularly as more housing advertisements go 
online and eschew print media.276  This chasm threatens to undo some of the 
positive gains from § 3604(c), including its benefits to social norms.  Discrim-
inatory advertisements on the Internet can spread prejudicial norms with un-
precedented reach and rapidity, eroding the gains from § 3604(c)’s prohibition 
of discriminatory housing speech in print media, television, and oral commu-
nications. 
In response to the potential of the CDA to undermine § 3604(c), some 
commentators have argued that Congress should amend the CDA to specifi-
cally exempt website operators from immunity for FHA claims.277  While this 
would better safeguard fair housing and social norms, it may not be practicable 
for websites that have thousands of advertisements flowing in daily or weekly.  
Even a diligent website operation, when operating under high volume and rapid 
posting by users, is bound to miss some discriminatory advertisements.278 
Another option to reduce normative and other injuries from discrimina-
tory housing statements online is a legal rule that looks to whether a website 
has created a filtering and blocking system that is calculated to be effective, 
and is in fact reasonably effective, at preventing discriminatory housing adver-
tisements.  For example, the website could create systems that automatically 
block certain terms in housing or roommate advertisements, such as “kids,” 
and create a warning that appears on the screen explaining that preferences or 
limitations based on protected categories violate federal or state law.279  The 
liability of the online service provider would hinge on the quality of the filter-
ing and blocking process rather than on the publication of individual discrimi-
natory advertisements.  This approach could balance the interests of website 
 
REV. 1471, 1494 (2008); Rachel Kurth, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting 
Civil Rights and Free Speech on the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. the Communi-
cations Decency Act, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 805, 828 (2007) (proposing plain-
tiff-friendly discovery standards for unmasking posters in housing discrimination 
suits). 
 276. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Newspaper Circulation Falls Sharply, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/31/business/media/31pa-
per.html (describing decline in newspaper circulation as a result of the Internet). 
 277. See, e.g., Crossett, supra note 24, at 211; Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1174. 
 278. Of course, fair housing enforcers face the same, and in some respects steeper, 
burdens.  Fair housing organizations or private parties who wish to sue individual post-
ers for § 3604(c) violations must comb through a high volume of advertisements and 
complete legal discovery processes to unmask posters. 
 279. Cf. Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1174–76 (proposing exempting the FHA from the 
CDA). 
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operators against the normative and other harms from discriminatory housing 
speech.280 
B. Discriminatory Roommate Advertisements 
There has been significant debate about whether roommates should be 
regulated under the FHA.281  The Mrs. Murphy exemption shields roommate 
seekers who refuse applicants or alter the terms and conditions of the rental 
based on protected characteristics.282  However, the exemption does not apply 
to discriminatory housing statements under § 3604(c).  Roommate seekers may 
not lawfully place discriminatory advertisements or make discriminatory state-
ments regarding the rental.283 
Liability for roommate advertisements under § 3604(c) has generated 
substantial controversy.  Some commentators maintain that a roommate situa-
tion involves such close physical association and intimacy that it should not be 
subject to the FHA in any way.284  Others reason that it makes little sense to 
forbid discriminatory roommate advertisements and similar speech but allow 
discriminatory refusals to rent.285  Fair housing scholar Rigel Oliveri argues 
that not applying the exemptions to § 3604(c) runs counter to the widespread 
belief that one can discriminate in roommate selection, violates norms of free 
choice about intimate associations within our dwellings, and creates public 
backlash.286  Perhaps the thorniest issue is whether roommates should be able 
to advertise a gender preference in light of concerns about privacy, nudity, or 
sexual assault. 
The power of social norms to reduce the expression of prejudiced atti-
tudes and promote egalitarian behavior offers a rejoinder to these critiques.  A 
proliferation of discriminatory roommate advertisements would create the per-
ception of widespread prejudice and might deter roommate seekers from con-
sidering a range of potential roommates.  One scholar argues that “it does little 
good to conceal the existence of these preferences [for roommates based on 
protected characteristics under the FHA].”287  Yet, an abundant body of social 
science research suggests the contrary is true.  There are significant benefits to 
 
 280. In addition, lowering the costs of prosecuting individual posters who discrim-
inate would be helpful.  This could be done through more plaintiff-friendly discovery 
standards for FHA violations on the Internet.  See Kurth, supra note 275, at 828. 
 281. See, e.g., Brenna R. McLaughlin, #AirbnbWhileBlack: Repealing the Fair 
Housing Act’s Mrs. Murphy Exemption to Combat Racism on Airbnb, 2018 WIS. L. 
REV. 149, 178–79; Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1153–67. 
 282. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2018). 
 283. Id. § 3604(c). 
 284. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J. 
624, 687 (1980) (“[A]ny government intrusion on personal choice of living arrange-
ments demands substantial justification . . . .”). 
 285. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1165. 
 286. Id. at 1162–64. 
 287. Id. at 1171. 
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social norms and the expression of prejudice from prohibiting discriminatory 
communications.  Of course, as discussed previously, immunity under the 
CDA for online service providers may have undone some of these gains.  Re-
moving liability under § 3604(c) for individuals seeking roommates, either on 
the Internet or in other forums, would worsen this situation. 
It is not clear why this result, with its increase in the appearance of prej-
udiced statements, is necessary.  After all, under the current structure of the 
FHA, the roommate-seeker is ultimately free to refuse a roommate or room-
mate rental so long as he or she avoids discriminatory statements.288  While 
this may be frustrating or upsetting to both parties seeking a roommate, it is 
questionable whether these effects outweigh the harms to social norms from 
discriminatory advertisements.  It is also possible that neutral advertisements 
might lead a roommate-seeker to accept someone from a group he or she ini-
tially intended to avoid.  This could, in turn, create the type of “contact” and 
interaction that psychologists have found to sometimes reduce prejudice.289 
CONCLUSION 
The psychology of social norms suggests a critical, yet often overlooked, 
purpose of housing speech regulation: to promote norms against expressing 
prejudice and against discrimination.  The social norms research casts the 
FHA’s surprising prohibition on discriminatory housing statements in a fresh 
light.  Communication of a norm or consensus viewpoint can affect listeners’ 
attitudes, willingness to express prejudice, and discriminatory behavior.  As a 
result, discriminatory housing speech is not mere talk or injury solely to mem-
bers of protected groups.  Instead, it imposes a normative result contrary to the 
mission of the FHA to promote integration and reduce discrimination.  Social 
science research suggests that prejudiced communications can shape listener 
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